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CONTINUITY, CHANGE AND INNOVATION IN EMERGING
CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY SYSTEMS: BELGIUM AND LUXEMBOURG
JASON J. KILBORN*
It is a matter of duty for any evolved society to attack this scourge [of consumer
overindebtedness].1
Consumer bankruptcy-it's not just for the heavily indebted any more! One is
not surprised to find debt relief laws in a country like the United States, legendary
for high levels of debt-financed consumer spending. 2 But what of Europe? The
development of consumer insolvency law seemed inevitable in countries like
Germany, for example, where total consumer debt more the doubled between the
mid-1980s and the mid-1990s. 3 But in Belgium and Luxembourg, consumers
largely escaped or ignored this invasion of liberalized lending. Consumers on
average devoted roughly 20% of their disposable income to non-mortgage
consumer debt in the 1990s in the U.S., and 17% in Germany, but only about 6.5%
in Belgium.4 In Luxembourg between 1994 and 2000, consumers on average
dedicated only 11% of their monthly disposable income to servicing their total debt
burden, both mortgage and non-mortgage.5 Lawmakers in the United States just
moved to restrict access to the bankruptcy system. Why would such mildly
indebted countries as Belgium and Luxembourg move in the opposite direction and
join the "consumer bankruptcy" movement in Europe?
This article explores the thought process behind the recent enactment of
consumer debt relief law in Belgium and Luxembourg, two of the least indebted
countries in Europe. It explores how legislators in these states overcame their
reticence to adopt formal consumer debt relief procedures and how they ultimately
chose to structure such relief. In so doing, this article discusses the extent to which
the consumer debt relief systems in Belgium and Luxembourg reflect continuity,

* LSU Law Center. I offer heartfelt thanks to Emily Kadens, Jay Westbrook, and the participants
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EUROPEAN UNION 53 tbl.A l8 (2000), availableat http://www.ecri.be/media/research report/ECR1en.pdf.
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change, and innovation in terms of the existing systems in neighboring countries,
especially France.
In addition, the development of consumer debt relief systems in Belgium and
Luxembourg is a harbinger of what is likely to come as other countries with civil
law systems, like Spain and Portugal-not to mention the entire South American
6
continent-begin to grapple with the problem of rising consumer indebtedness.
These new laws offer alternatives to the highly maligned "debtor-friendly" model of
Anglo-American consumer "bankruptcy." To the civilian mind, the AngloAmerican common law tends to take a rather sterilely economic approach to
analyzing contractual obligations, which contrasts sharply with the deep moral
commitment to the sanctity of contracts in the civil law. 7 Recent experience in
Belgium and Luxembourg shows that consumer debt relief laws need not
undermine civilian dedication to the sanctity of contracts and can successfully
integrate into a "French civil law" system. The path to enactment of these laws
demonstrates that consumer debt relief can be appropriate and necessary well before
debt levels reach those in the U.S. and Germany.
As more and more countries adopt and develop their own unique regimes of
consumer debt relief, opportunities for cross-systemic learning are multiplying
rapidly. This exchange can occur, however, only if policy makers have ready
access to information about how these systems operate, both in theory and in
reality. This Article continues the process that I began a few years ago 8 of breaking
down barriers of language and legal culture to create a foundation of shared
knowledge and experience-in English-from a wide array of new consumer
bankruptcy systems.
The story of consumer debt relief in Belgium and
Luxembourg reflects a definite direction of shared development in responding to the
challenges of the modem consumer credit economy. In particular, these systems
offer a new and unique perspective on how best to assign responsibility among
creditors and their distressed debtors.
Part I provides some context for the discussion to come by describing the
French consumer debt relief system, which strongly influenced the laws in Belgium
and Luxembourg. The French law has evolved over 15 years to support more

6 See, e.g., CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 85, 121 (Johanna Niemi-Kiesilainen et al..
eds., Hart Publishing 2003) (highlighting contributions of Jos6 Reinaldo de Lima Lopes and Maria Manuel
Leit~o Marques and Catarina Frade on movement toward consumer "bankruptcy" legislation in Brazil and
Portugal, respectively).
7 See, e.g., Vivian Grosswald Curran, Cultural Immersion, Differences and Categories in U.S.
Comparative Law, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 43, 81-82 & n. 130 (1998) (collecting sources exploring the general
contrast between European and U.S. views of contractual obligations); Johanna Niemi-Kiesiliinen,
Consumer Bankruptcy in Comparison: Do We Cure a Market Failure or a Social Problem?, 37 OSGOODE
HALL L. J. 473,476-82 (1999).
8 See Kilbom, supra note 3 (analyzing German system, effective since 1999); Jason Kilbom, La
Responsabilisation de l'Economie: What the United States Can Learn From the New French Law on
Consumer Overindebtedness, 26 MICH. J. INT'L L. 619 (2005) (analyzing French system, effective since
1990, but substantially amended several times since then).
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consensual workouts, to demand less of average debtors, and to offer greater relief
to the most needy. Part II analyzes in detail the adoption and first few years of
development of the Belgian and Luxembourguish laws, tracking the extent to which
the new laws maintain or alter elements of the "parent" system in France. The new
laws in Belgium and Luxembourg seem to have picked up where the French law left
off in the late 1990s, and all three systems now seem to be headed in largely the
same direction in practice. Finally, Part III explores some innovative ways in which
Belgium and Luxembourg have implemented special debt relief funds, which
function in part to hold creditors accountable for their role in creating the need for
these new recovery systems.
I.

THE "PARENT" SYSTEM: CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY IN FRANCE, 1990-2004

Belgium and Luxembourg entered the battle against consumer overindebtedness
quite late, a decade after the first consumer debt relief laws began to emerge on the
European continent. Because they were not drafting on a clean slate, lawmakers in
Belgium and Luxembourg learned from the experience of neighboring states.
Given their cultural and linguistic ties to France, they understandably used the
French system as a guide. The legislative history of the consumer debt relief laws
in both Belgium and Luxembourg makes fleeting reference to existing and planned
laws in Denmark and Germany, but it is peppered with references to the French
system and its first few years of successes and challenges. 9 Indeed, although all
legislative activity in Belgium is conducted in both French and Dutch, the consumer
debt relief law was drafted in French-and the legislative history is replete with
criticisms of the Dutch translation of the French original.' 0 Lawmakers in
Luxembourg were also heavily inspired by the French law and drew liberallyoften verbatim-from the final Belgian law. 1

9 See,
e.g., Doc.
part. Srnat (1997-1998) no. 929/5,
pp.
13-15,
available at
http://www.senat.be/wwwcgi/get-pdf?l6777529; Doc. part. Chambre (1991-1992) no. 274/3, pp. 56-57,
available at www3.dekamer.be/digidoc/DPS/K2331/K23310964/K23310964.pdf;
Doc. part. Chambre
(1996-1997)
no.
1073/1,
pp.
16,
18,
available
at
http://www.lachambre.be/FLWB/pdf/49/1073/49KI073001.pdf;
Doc. part. no. 3813, available at
http://www.chd.lu/servlet/Merge?lot=J-1992-O-0454&lib=chdl (proposing a system for Luxembourg
virtually
identical
to that in France);
Doc. part. no.
3813, D~bat, available at
http://www.chd.lu/servlet/Merge?lot=C-1993-O-005&lib=chdl (noting that this early proposal had been
drawn virtually verbatim from the French law and observing the difficulties that the French law had
encountered).
10 See, e.g., Doc. part. Chambre no. 1073/1, supra note 10, at 78, 82; Doc. parl. Chambre no. 1073/11,
supra note 1, at 30, 40; Doc. parl. Srnat (1997-1998) no. 929/3, pp. 1-2, available at
http://www.senat.be/wwwcgi/get-pdfP16777527; Doc. parl. Sdnat (1997-1998) no. 929/4, p. 2, available at
http://www.senat.be/wwwcgi/get-pdf?16777528; Doc. parl. Chambre (2004-2005) no. 1309/002, p. 15,
available at http://www.lachambre.be/FLWB/pdf/51/1309/51KI309002.pdf (suggesting that the entire text
of the latest reform bill be submitted to a Dutch linguistic adviser for more accurate translation from the
French).
11 See, e.g, Doc. par]. no. 4409, p. 3, available at http://www.chd.lu/servlet/Merge?lot=J-1997-O0259&lib=chdl;
Doc.
parl.
no.
4409/07,
pp.
3-4
(15
Feb.
2000),
available at
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Therefore, a brief overview of the French system of "individual
overindebtedness" will enhance our appreciation of where the systems in Belgium
and Luxembourg began. More importantly, it will focus attention on areas of
continuity and change, where the French law was seen as "strong," and might
therefore remain a model for future laws, or where the French model left something
to be desired. Additionally, this brief overview will reveal changes that French
legislators themselves made in their own system after Belgium and Luxembourg
had modeled their laws on the prior version, which in turn reflects on perhaps
"unfinished business" in the Belgian and Luxembourguish systems.
A. Stage One: Commission Proposes a Consensual,Negotiated Payment Plan
Effective in early 1990, the French "Loi Neiertz" was the second law of its kind
on the European continent to provide specific relief to over-indebted consumers. 2 It
added a series of sections to the Consumer Code on "Treatment of Situations of
Overindebtedness," which progressed through several rounds of amendments over
the next 14 years.
French consumers initiate "overindebtedness" cases by filing a petition for
relief with one of the "commissions on individual overindebtedness" established in
each of the 117 departements in France. Six voting members comprise each
commission: The prefect, treasurer-general, and director of fiscal services in each
department occupy three of the voting positions. To these are added two
"partisans," one nominated by the credit sector and one by consumer associations.
Finally, the departmental representative of the French central bank-the Banque de
France-rounds out the voting membership of each commission. A lawyer and a
social worker provide "consultation" to each commission, but they do not vote. The
debtor might or might not be represented by a lawyer in this process, but these
commissions-not the debtor or her lawyer--completely control the process after
the filing of the debtor's petition. Specifically, the Banque de France is charged
with collecting information from the debtor and third parties, preparing a payment
plan, and negotiating its acceptance by the debtor and all creditors.
The great bulk of cases end at this stage. In the early years of the system,
debtors and creditors were reconciled to consensual payment plans in just less than
half of all cases. Over the last decade, between 60% and 70% of all cases have
concluded at this first, "consensual plan" stage. Many have predicted that the
earlier plans are likely to fail, however, as creditors rarely agree to forgive any
amount of debt, even if the debtor is clearly unable to pay over time. The earliest
plans often extended over as many as 15 years and left very little income to debtors.
http://www.chd.lu/servlet/Merge?lot=J-1999-O-0660&lib=chdl; Doc. parl. no. 4409/11, pp. 9-10 (3 Oct.
2000), availableat http://www.chd.lu/servlet/Merge?lot=J-1999-O-0668&lib=chdl.
12 For a detailed description of the French system and its development, see Jason Kilbom, La
Responsabilisation de l'Economie: What the U.S. Can Learn From the New French Law on Consumer
Overindebtedness, 26 MICH. J. INT'L L. 619 (2005). All of the statements in this Part are drawn from the
research described in this recent article on the French system.

2006]

EMERGING CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY SYSTEMS

As of 1999, all payment plans must leave to debtors at least whatever income the
exemption laws shield from seizure, and as of 2003, the maximum length of any
consensual plan is limited to 10 years (unless a longer period is necessary to cover
mortgage debt).
B. Stage Two: Commission Recommendations to the Court
If any creditor rejects the commission's proposed plan, at the debtor's request,
the commission forwards the case to a court with a recommendation that the court
impose "ordinary" or "extraordinary" measures of relief. In most cases, the
commission proposes that the court impose a payment plan with "ordinary"
measures of relief. Such relief is limited to extensions or deferrals of time to pay,
reductions in accruing interest, and discharge of a deficiency obligation remaining
after the sale of an over-encumbered home. No other debt can be discharged at this
stage. The maximum duration of a court-imposed plan was originally limited to 5
years, but that limit was extended to 8 years in 1999 and then again to 10 years in
2004. Imposed plans containing these "ordinary" measures of relief currently
account for just over half of the remaining cases not treated at the consensual
stage-about 15% of all administered cases.
For particularly overextended debtors whose meager income leaves them
unable to repay any significant portion of their debts, the law since 1999 allows for
"extraordinary" measures. The commission can recommend simply that the court
impose a global deferral of all of the debtor's obligations for up to two years
(reduced from three years in 2004). At the conclusion of this period, the
commission reevaluates the debtor's situation. If the debtor's financial situation has
improved, the commission must recommend a plan with "ordinary" relief measures.
If the debtor remains unable to pay any significant portion of her debts, the
commission must recommend a partial discharge of the debtor's remaining debts.
Recently, the commissions have recommended partial discharge in only about 4%
of all administered cases-up from less than 2% in the early 2000s. The percentage
of debts to be discharged is left to the commission's discretion, but a full discharge
of all debts is available only to a small subset of debtors.
C. Alternative Stage One: Anglo-American Style "PersonalRecovery"
Finally, as of February 2004, the commissions can refer the most desperately
and hopelessly overwhelmed debtors immediately to the court for a new procedure
of "personal recovery." Much like the U.S. system of "chapter 7" liquidation
bankruptcy, the personal recovery process requires only that the debtor give up her
non-exempt property for liquidation and distribution to creditors (although very few
debtors have any valuable non-exempt assets at this stage). Upon completion of
this simple step, the court declares the case closed for "asset insufficiency," and
most of the debtor's remaining obligations are "erased."
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Unlike the U.S. system, the French personal recovery process is strictly
reserved for those whose financial situation is "irremediably compromised." The
commissions can refer cases out of the "normal" process only if it is "manisfestly
impossible" to address the debtor's distress within the confines of the normal system
of "ordinary" payment plans and "extraordinary" global deferrals and partial
discharges. In the first ten months of availability of the new procedure, the
commissions have referred just under 14% of all administered cases to the "personal
recovery" procedure. This "alternative stage one" appears to be slowly replacing
the "extraordinary" recommendation stage for debtors whose heightened level of
distress is immediately apparent.
II. FOLLOWING THE LEARNING CURVE-CONTINUITY AND CHANGE
This Part traces the development of the new consumer debt relief legislation in
Belgium and Luxembourg, focusing on those provisions that represent either a
continuation or evolutionary change 13 from the French model on which these new
systems are based. Part II.A explores the thought process that gave impetus to the
new laws despite relatively low levels of aggregate debt. Parts II.B and II.C report
that the strongest elements of continuity in Europe remain strong in Belgium and
Luxembourg. The gateway to these newest systems remains an out-of-court attempt
at a consensual arrangement with creditors (II.B), and relief is strictly conditioned
on the fulfillment of a multi-year payment plan, even if "purely symbolic" (II.C). In
practice, the new systems in Belgium and Luxembourg seem to be carrying forward
the French system's evolution, moving away from theoretical antagonism toward
undermining obligations and toward a more economic focus, moderating the
demands on debtors and offering more decisive relief. Part II.D surveys the results
of the first few years of these new systems.
A. Early Resistance Gives Way to Nuanced Acceptance of Consumer Debt Relief
Expanded availability of "easy" consumer credit inevitably leads to individual
excesses-both intentional and unintentional.
Even in moderately indebted
Belgium and Luxembourg, individual instances of excessive consumer debt created
serious and wide-spread social problems. The story of consumer debt relief in
Belgium and Luxembourg shows how effective policy emerges from a skeptical and
nuanced evaluation of aggregate statistics in light of localized evidence of real
human distress.

13 For

a discussion of revolutionary innovations, see infra Part HI.
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1. Moderate Debt Unevenly Distributed
Average rates of indebtedness in Belgium were among the most moderate in
Europe in the 1990s-just behind the slightly elevated numbers in France. From
the late 1980s to the late 1990s, total non-mortgage consumer credit consistently
accounted for between 6% and 7% of aggregate disposable household income in
Belgium and 8% in France, as compared to 16%-17% in Germany and 19%-20% in
the U.S. 14 Even adding mortgage debt to the balance, total household credit in the
1990s on average absorbed only about 35% of disposable income in Belgium and
50% in France, well below the heavy burden of over 70% in Germany and over
90% in the U.S. 15 The relatively affluent population of Luxembourg shouldered an
even lighter debt burden than their northern Belgian neighbors: Between 1994 and
2000, households in Luxembourg in the aggregate dedicated only about 11% of
their monthly disposable income to6 monthly debt payments, both to mortgage
creditors and to consumer financers.1
These aggregate statistics and averages, however, hide the painful truth about
the uneven weight of the debt burden on individual debtors. The debt just described
was not evenly distributed among households in Belgium and Luxembourg. Many
families remained debt-free, while others carried a larger-than-average share, in
many cases more than their future income could manage.' 7 By lumping all
households together, aggregate statistics create a misleading image based on the
national population's financial health and propensity for borrowing.
More focused statistics painted quite a different picture of the debt burden
weighing on many consumers in Belgium and Luxembourg in the 1990s. While
residents of Luxembourg on average dedicated only about 11% of monthly
disposable income to debt service, the indebted population paid about 20%, while
the most heavily indebted quartile relinquished about 37% of their disposable
income every month to their creditors.1 8 The figures in the Belgian national
consumer credit reporting database tell a similar story of rising and concentrated
levels of distress. In 1995, the portion of Belgian consumer credit contracts in
default rose to 13.74%. 19 Between 1993 and 2000, the number of Belgian
consumers with registered credit defaults of one degree or another rose 28% from
just over 300,000 to just over 385,000-just under 5% of the total adult population

14 See DIEZ GUARDIA, supra note 4, at 21, 53 tbl.A18
15 See id. at 49 tbl.A14
16See REINSTADLER, supra note 5, at 2 & tbl.Tl.
17 See, e.g., id. at 2 tbl.T1 & n.3 (noting that between 41% and 47% of households in Luxembourg carried

no debt between 1994 and 2000).
18See id. at 5 & tbl.T2, 10 & tbl.T7.
19See Doc. parl. S~nat no. 929/5, supra note 9, at 3.
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of Belgium in 2000.20 These Belgian consumers were saddled with arrearages
totaling over 1.2 billion in 1995, and over 1.75 billion in 2000.21
Individualized surveys of actual debtors buttressed these more focused
statistics. A study commissioned by the EU Commission's Directorate General for
Health and Consumer Protection reported that, in 1996, 64% of Belgian households
and 29% of ''22households in Luxembourg with non-mortgage loans were
"overindebted.
Similarly, according to reports from socio-economic agencies
within Luxembourg, between 1995 and 2000, a significant and consistent segment
of that country's population-about 20%-indicated that their current income only
allowed them to make do financially with significant difficulty.2 3
Whatever aggregate debt figures might have suggested about the low levels of
indebtedness in Belgium and Luxembourg, a significant percentage of consumers in
these countries were experiencing debt problems that legislators would feel
compelled to address. As the Chamber of Civil Servants and Public Employees of
Luxembourg observed, "one individual case [of overindebtedness] is already one
too many. '24 Ultimately, legislators responded to real reports of human suffering
rather than to comforting but misleading statistical averages.
2.

Opposition and Support For Legislative Relief

In both Belgium and Luxembourg, legislators began pressing for legal relief for
financially overburdened consumers in the early 1990s. Also in both states, a final
law would emerge only after many years of discussion and debate-and,
incidentally, after a change of monarchs in both states. Lawmakers filed the first
Belgian proposal for combatting the ill effects of "overindebtedness" in the House
of Representatives in March 1992,25 under King Baudouin. It would take nearly
seven years to achieve a final law under a new King, Baudouins' brother Albert II.

20 See GIANNI BETFI ET AL.., ORC MACRO, STUDY OF THE PROBLEM OF CONSUMER INDEBTEDNESS:

STATISTICAL
ASPECTS
43
&
tbl.4.2
(2001),
available
at
http://europa.eu.int/comrnconsumers/consint/fina-serv/cons-directive/fina-servO6_sum-fr.pdf; Doc. parl.
Chambre no. 1073/1, supra note 9, at 4.
21 See BETI ET AL.., supra note 20, at 43 & tbl.4.2.
22 See id. at 2-3 & tbl. 1.1.
23 See REINSTADLER, supra note 5, at 4 & tbl.G3.
24 Doc.
parl. no. 4409/02, p. 2, available at http://www.chd.lu/servlet/Merge?lot=J-1997-O0436&lib=chdl.
25
See

Doc.

parl.

Chambre

(1991-1992)

no.

274/1,

available

at

http://www3.dekamer.be/digidoc/DPS/K2331/K23310950/K23310950.pdf. Similar proposals followed in
May
1993,
see
Doc.
parl.
Chambre
(1992-1993)
no.
1047/1,
available
at
http://www3.dekamer.be/digidoc/DPS/K2343/K23431784/K23431784.pdf, and February 1994, see Doc.
parl.
Chambre
(1993-1994)
no.
1324/1,
available
at
http://www3.dekamer.be/digidoc/DPS/K2348/K23480615/K23480615.pdf. A House committee would
ultimately rework and combine all of these proposals. See Doc. parl. Chambre no. 274/3, supra note 9, at 23. On the basis of this committee's report, the Belgian government introduced in 1996 the bill that became
the final law on "collective debt arrangements." See Doc. parl. Chambre no. 1073/1, supra note 9.
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In Luxembourg, a bill was introduced in July 1993, while Grand Duke Jean still
reigned 6 A final law would emerge only in December 2000, three months after
Jean's son, Henri, ascended to power. Indeed, the new system in Luxembourg was
finally implemented only in October 2001, as the regulatory framework was put in
place. Discussion of consumer debt relief in Belgium and Luxembourg was marked
by significant ambivalence in the early years. After years of debate and reflection,
however, lawmakers in even these moderately indebted countries were convinced of
the necessity of legislative relief for their overextended constituents.
In Belgium, opponents of consumer "bankruptcy" legislation continuously
insisted that aggregate statistics showed that wild-eyed stories of a rising tide of
indebtedness simply did not reflect reality, as Belgium remained among the least
indebted countries in Europe.2 7 And even if Belgians had begun to experience debt
problems, opponents of the new bill argued, existing law adequately protected
debtors and provided sufficient means of avoiding the "dehumanizing" effects of
overly aggressive debt collection.2 8 For example, the Belgian Civil Code allowed
overextended debtors to petition a judge for "moderate" temporary payment delays
and suspension of enforcement proceedings.2 9 In addition, Belgian law shielded
30
most household property, along with much of the debtor's income, from creditors.
Further restrictions on debt collection, opponents argued, might dissuade lenders
from extending consumer credit. 31 In the final analysis, opponents of consumer debt
relief argued that such a law should only apply to perhaps 10%-15% of consumer
debtors in any event. 32 They urged lawmakers to be attentive to any potential use of
such a law by those simply seeking to avoid moderate payment difficulties.
Consumer and creditor advocates alike countered that existing legislative
responses were simply inadequate when debtors faced large claims from a variety of
mutually antagonistic fronts (e.g., consumer credit, utility bills, welfare and tax
debts to the state, alimony and other family support debts).33 Even the national
representative of official (state-controlled) debt collectors argued that a compulsory
and collective approach to consumer debt adjustment represented "the only realistic
approach" to situations of consumer overindebtedness. He pointed out that the
recalcitrance of aggressive creditors like the state all too often derailed the state

26See Doc. part. no. 3813, supra note 9.
27See, e.g., Doc. part. S~nat no. 929/5, supra note 9, at 7-10.
28 See, e.g., Doc. part. Chambre no. 274/3, supra note 9, at 7-8, 36, 68. Similar arguments were made in
Luxembourg by the Chamber of Commerce. See Doc. part. no. 4409/05, p. 3, available at
httx://www.chd.lu/servlet/Merge?lot=J- 1998-O-0068&lib=chdl.
See C. Civ. BELG. art. 1244.
30See Doc. part. Chambre no. 274/3, supra note 9, at 8. For a discussion of current Belgian exemptions
law, see infra notes 106-12 and accompanying text.
31See Doc. part. Chambre no. 274/3, supra note 9, at 8; Doc. part. Chambre no. 1073/11, supra note 1, at 4
("None would contest that credit is an indispensable element to any modem economic system.").
32See Doc. parl. Chambre no. 274/3, supra note 9, at 8, 16.
33 See id. at 6, 36, 51; see also Doc. parl. Chambre no. 1073/1, supra note 9, at 6-8; Doc. parl. no.
4409/05, supra note 28, at 3 (same concession by Luxembourg Chamber of Commerce).
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collectors' attempts to negotiate settlements between debtors and creditors, 34 leading
35
to a needless accumulation of fees and expenses and a dead-weight loss of value.
Ultimately, the specific observations of consumer counselors persuaded
legislators that the time had come for formal relief from consumer
overindebtedness.36 The government and legislature in Luxembourg, for example,
relied not on statistics, but on the on-the-ground experience of the National Service
for the Fight Against Overindebtedness, an association chartered by the state in
1993 to unite several consumer debt counseling agencies. 37 Lawmakers in both
Belgium and Luxembourg were moved by accounts from consumer counselors of
the troubling reactions of many of their individual clients to the advances of debt
collectors.
Financially overwhelmed consumers faced social withdrawal and
isolation. Many "buried their heads in the sand" to avoid confronting the fact that
their credit problems had overtaken them. 38 Eventually, consumer advocates
reported, credit problems had led to health problems, family tension, and other
social ills, and ultimately to an increased welfare burden on the state.39
Legislators accepted that overindebtedness is not a system-wide problem to be
measured in the aggregate, but rather the concentrated, case-by-case result of
diverse factors, such as illness, accidents, divorce and separation, and most
importantly unemployment. 40 To be sure, easier access to credit through credit cards
and similar modem devices had laid the foundation for potentially irresponsible
borrowing and spending. Indeed, the authors of the draft law in Luxembourg
placed particular blame for overindebtedness on the "manipulation" of consumers
by the "aggressive and omnipresent advertising of credit establishments."4 1 But
lawmakers acknowledged that, whatever the combination of causal factors,
overindebtedness had become a widespread and serious problem that called for
legislative intervention.
Moreover, on a pragmatic level, lawmakers stressed the senselessness of
maintaining over a course of years "the illusion that the debt concerned might still
be recovered., 42 The early observations of one Belgian legislator nicely sum up the
legislative mindset:

34 A representative of the Belgian Justices of the Peace testified that official debt collectors had brokered
settlements in hundreds of thousands of consumer debt cases. See Doc. parl. Chambre no. 274/3, supra note
9, at 31.
31 See id. at 23.
36 See, e.g., Doc. parl. Sdnat no. 929/5, supra note 9, at 2-3.
37 See infra note 65; Doc. parl. no. 4409, supra note 11, at 2-3, 19-21; Doc. parl. no. 4409/1I,
supra note
11, at 4-6.
38 See Doc. parl. Chambre no. 274/3, supra note 9, at 5; see also Doc. parl. no. 4409, supra note 10, at 3.
39 See Doc. parl. Chambre no. 274/3, supra note 9, at 5; see also Doc. parl. Chambre no. 1073/11,
supra
note 1, at 3, 6; Doc. parl. Sdnat no. 929/5, supra note 9, at 3.
40 See, e.g., Doc. parl. Chambre no. 274/3, supra note 9, at 5-6; Doc. parl. Chambre no. 1073/1, supra note
9, at 6; Doc. parl. no. 4409, supra note 11, at 2-3; Doc. parl. no. 4409/04, p. 3, available at
http://www.chd.lu/servlet/Merge?lot=J-1997-0-0615&lib=chdl; Doc. parl. no. 4409/05, supra note 28, at 2.
1See Doc. parl. no. 4409, supra note 11, at 11-12.
42 Doc. parl. Chambre no. 274/3, supra note 9, at 80.
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It is clear.., that judicial and contractual security are essential
in our society. Nonetheless, what is the significance of such
security when the debtor is a person who is confronted with
problems of such a gravity that she is virtually destitute in a
material sense and from whom creditors will collect nothing more
despite all their pursuits and legal actions? Doubtless, for judicial
and contractual security, a long-term arrangement [payment plan] is
preferable in such a case to the absence of any arrangement and the
infinite multiplication of procedures before the courts.43

The new laws in both Belgium and Luxembourg thus expressly reject the theoretical
formalism of insisting upon the sanctity of contract. Instead, these laws focus on
practical considerations, defending consumer debt relief on two largely economic
grounds: First, such relief is designed to "reinsert" the overburdened consumer into
the economy and avoid the losses that "social exclusion" would otherwise
occasion. 44 Belgian lawmakers emphasized repeatedly that "[t]he discharge of debts
is the only means of reintegrating the overindebted person into the economic
system. Otherwise, this person becomes marginalized, confines herself to the
underground economy, and becomes a burden for society., 45 Lawmakers in
Luxembourg likewise aimed explicitly to "reduce[e] the social cost resulting from
social exclusion.",46 As a second and related justification for relief, the Belgian law
borrowed from the U.S. the now virtually universal "slogan" of consumer
bankruptcy: to offer overburdened consumers a "fresh start" (literally, "new start" in
both French and Dutch, "nouveau depart" and "nieuwe start"). 47 With these new
laws, lawmakers in both Belgium and Luxembourg sought to deliver "dignity and
hope 4 8 and "offer perspectives for a better life" to overindebted persons.49

41Id. at 62.
44See, e.g., Doc. parl. Chambre no. 1073/11, supra note 1, at 11. Once again a European state has adopted
the "open credit economy" justification articulated by Margaret Howard many years ago. See Margaret
Howard, A Theory of Dischargein Consumer Bankruptcy, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 1047, 1048 (1987).
45Doc. parl. Chambre no. 1073/1, supra note 9, at 11, 17, 45; Doc. parl. Chambre no. 1073/11, supra note
1, at 6.
46Doc. parl. no. 4409, supra note 11, at 3; see also id. at 5 (adding as a general basis for the new law, "to
resolve difficult financial situations susceptible of producing nefarious human consequences").
47See Doc. parl. Chambre no. 1073/1, supra note 9, at 12, 45; Doc. parl. Chambre no. 1073/11, supra note
1, at 7, 26.
48Doc. parl. Chambre no. 1073/11, supra note 1, at 7.
49Doc. parl. no. 4409/11, supra note 11, at 12 (noting that the new law affects civil and procedural law,
but insisting on the goal of "reinforce[ing] our social legislation").
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3. Enactment of the New Laws: How To Categorize Consumer Debt Relief?
The first contrast between the French "parent" model and the overindebtedness
laws in Belgium and Luxembourg is the location of these new provisions within the
body of the law. French law places "individual overindebtedness" under the rubric
of consumer law, codifying its relief provisions in the Consumer Code. Belgian
lawmakers, in contrast, viewed consumer debt relief as fundamentally procedural
law, restricting creditors' rights to enforce their claims. Thus, "to realize the
greatest correspondence possible with existing procedural rules, ' 50 Belgian
lawmakers placed their new consumer debt relief provisions in a newly created title
in the "enforcement" section of the Judicial [Procedural] Code called simply
"Collective Debt Arrangement."' 5 1 In Luxembourg, consumer debt relief is
apparently viewed as sui generis social welfare law. The new provisions comprise
a free-standing law, called simply the law "on overindebtedness," overseen mainly
by the Ministry of Families. 2
B. Consensual Out-of-CourtPayment Plans: Still the Gateway to Relief
As in all of the other current European systems, the process in both Belgium
and Luxembourg begins with an extra-judicial attempt at brokering a consensual
payment plan with creditors. The process in Belgium begins with the debtor's filing
a petition for relief in a court of first instance,5 3 but the court remains on the
margins of the process initially. In Luxembourg, debtors proceed just like in France
by filing their petitions with a non-judicial body.54 In slight but important contrast
with the French system, the new laws in Belgium and Luxembourg assign to
consumer debt counseling professionals the initial required task of admitting new
cases, 55 examining the debtor's situation, collecting information, and proposing a
consensual arrangement among debtors and creditors.

so Doc. parl. Chambre no. 1073/1, supra note 9, at 14; cf Charles W. Mooney, Jr., A Normative Theory of
Bankruptcy Law: Bankruptcy As (Is) Civil Procedure, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 931 (2004).
51See CODE JUDICIAIRE/GERECHTELIJK WETBOEK [hereinafter CJ/GW] arts. 1675/2 to 1675/19.
52 Law of 8 Dec. 2000, Mom. A, no. 136, 27 Dec. 2000, p. 2972, available at
http://www.legilux.public.lu/leg/a/archives/2000/1362712/1362712.pdf?SID=eb751ea3b5ac87b8da29d777d
2dfcddb#page=l.
53See CJ/GW arts. 1675/2, 1675/4.
54
See Law of 8 Dec. 2000, art. 3.
55 Unlike the French law, neither the Belgian nor the Luxembourguish law requires a showing of the
debtor's "good faith" as a prerequisite to initiating a case. Lawmakers in both Belgium and Luxembourg
explicitly rejected this requirement, in part because of the trouble that France had experienced with its
application, particularly the wide differences in interpretation of the notion among districts. See, e.g., Doc.
parl. Chambre no. 1073/1, supra note 9, at 16. The only requirement is that the debtor cannot have
"manifestly organized his insolvency." See CJ/GW art. 1675/2; Law of 8 Dec. 2000, art. 2. The legislative
history explains that this does not mean that the debtor simply took on more debt that she might reasonably
have foreseen being able to repay, but rather that she has acted fraudulently or criminally in subverting the
advances of creditors. See Doc. parl. Chambre no. 1073/1, supra note 9, at 17-18; Doc. parl. Chambre no.
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1. Belgium: The Debt-Mediator
In Belgium, the debtor's petition must nominate, and the court appoints, a "debtmediator."' 56 Designed to alleviate the potential burden on an already overworked
judiciary, the debt-mediator was part of every consumer debt relief proposal from
the outset.57 The law allows the debtor and court to choose the debt-mediator from
among lawyers, official debt collectors, and licensed public or private consumer
counseling agencies. 58 Although the law requires the debt-mediator to be
"independent and impartial, 59 lawmakers suggested that this debt-mediator would
probably be the person who had helped the debtor to assemble her petition. Some
doubted the impartiality of the very person who had assisted the debtor in preparing
her case, but such doubts were curtly brushed aside, in large part because
lawmakers assumed that this person would be "in virtually every case" not a lawyer,
60
but the state-licensed debt counseling service in the debtor's region.
Much like the system of Schuldnerberatungsstellein Germany, over 500 statelicensed consumer counseling services comprise a vast network spread across
Belgium. 6 1 These centers are thus widely available to consumers, and they are more
likely than lawyers to take on consumer debt cases for at least one other prominent
reason: A Royal Order limits the allowable fees for debt-mediator services to a
relatively low level-on average, about 500 to gather information and propose a

1073/11, supra note 1, at 28-35 (drawing a parallel with the Criminal Code art. 490/2 definition of
"organizing insolvency"); Doc. parl. S~nat no. 929/5, supra note 9, at 4. Note that the requirement that the
debtor explain in the petition the reasons for her inability to pay her debt, see CJ/GW art. 1675/4 § 1(12), is
designed simply to allow judge to gauge whether the debtor had "organized her insolvency"-this is not a
general "worthiness" rule like one finds in the Scandinavian systems. See Doc. parl. Chambre no. 1073/1,
supra note 9, at 27-28.
6 See CJ/GW arts. 1675/4 § 1(5), 1675/6 § 2.
57 See Doc. parl. Chambre no. 274/3, supra note 9, at 5 (describing the earliest Belgian proposals).
5589 See CJ/GW art. 1675/17 § 1.
See id. art. 1675/17 § 2.
60 See, e.g., Doc. parl. Chambre no. 1073/1, supra note 9, at 29, 52; Doc. parl. Chambre no. 1073/11, supra
note 1, at 39, 97, 101 (explaining away the apparent conflict of interest in part because the debt counselors"public centers of social assistance," abbreviated "CPAS" in French, "OCMW" in Dutch-almost never
recover any fees for pre-petition service, because they abandon fees in the interest of their state-supported
mission of service). The legislative history suggests that each court would maintain a list of acceptable
mediators. See Doc. parl. Chambre no. 1073/11, supra note 1, at 104. A website dedicated to helping
consumer debtors with the new system reports that courts are maintaining lists of acceptable debt-mediators,
but that some of these lists include only local lawyers, not the local debt counseling agencies. See
http://www.dignitas.be/index.php. Note that the prominence of these public counseling centers is a
significant contrast with U.S. practice-a contrast that should be borne in mind when considering a possible
transplant of the Belgian experience to the U.S.
61 These centers are distributed as follows: 177 in the southern, French area of Wallonia (Wallonie), 297 in
the northern, Dutch area of Flanders (Vlaams), and 29 in the capital area of Brussels. See L'OBSERVATOIRE
10 ANS D'OBSERVATOIRE 26 (2004), available at
DU CRtDIT ET DE L'ENDETTEMENT,
http://www.observatoirecredit.be/SiteOce/site.nsf/a9ee787768a96ef2c 12569a7004bc215/56c2fc7 18aa7806c I 256f54002ade3b/$FIL
E/BrochureFR.pdf [hereinafter OCE REPORT].
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plan, and 250- 300 per year to control the implementation of the plan if
confirmed.62
2.

Luxembourg: "Service" and "Commission"

In Luxembourg, debtors request relief by filing a petition with a state-funded
"Service of information and counsel in matters of overindebtedness." 63 The Service

65
64
then collects information and prepares a proposed payment plan. The two
currently existing "Services" are the latest embodiment of an association of several
non-profit agencies offering free debt counseling services since the early 1990s. In
late 1993, these agencies entered into an agreement of cooperation with the
Ministry of Families and began operating as one coordinated unit under the
umbrella name "National Service for the Fight Against Overindebtedness." 66 The
original mission of these agencies continues, as they still provide free counseling
for consumers and consultation with government agencies about consumer debt
policy. These "Services" now focus, however, on the preparation of payment plans
under the new law "on overindebtedness. 6 7
Thus, the Services are essentially analogous to the Belgian debt-mediators,
except only free consumer counseling agencies may act as "mediators." In contrast
with the Belgian debt-mediator, however, the Services' functions avoid the conflict

62 See Royal order of 18 Dec. 1998, M.B. 31 Dec. 1998, p. 41935-36. The fee
is limited to (1) for
collecting claims and preparing the plan, 15,000 Belgian francs (about 370) for cases with 5 or fewer
creditors, increased by 1000 francs (about 25) for every creditor above 5; (2) if the mediator needs to
engage judicial process to compel the production of information on the debtor in preparing the plan, 3000
francs (about 75) for each written declaration obtained; (3) for collecting payments owed to the debtor (e.g.,
wage payments), 250 francs (about 6) for every payment diverted from the debtor to the mediator during
the course of the plan; (4) for follow-up in controlling the implementation of the plan, 6000 francs per year
(just short of 150) for cases with 5 or fewer creditors, increased by 400 francs (just short of 10) for every
creditor above 5; and (5) if the plan has to be revised or revoked, 5000 francs (just short of 125) for each
such revision or revocation resulting in a judgment. See id. art. 2. In addition, the mediator received 2500
francs (about 60) for each required appearance at any court hearing. See id. art. 3. The mediators expenses
are also limited by this same order. For example, telephone, email, and photocopying charges are limited to
3000 francs (about 75) per case. See id. art. 4. These amounts are indexed for inflation, with increases
triggered with any 5% increase in the consumer price index. See id. art. 5.
3See Law of 8 Dec. 2000, art. 3; Grand-Ducal Order of 12 Oct. 2001, M6m. A, no. 134, 14 Nov. 2001,
p.
2668,
arts.
11-12,
available
at
http://www.legilux.public.lu/leg/a/archives/2001/1341411/1341411 .pdfSID=be962d099 Iea47fec6885ae253
4a33bd#page=2.
64See Law of 8 Dec. 2000, art. 4.
65 The two agencies currently operating a Service and their websites are
Inter-Actions Faubourgs
(www.inter-actions.lu) and the Luxembourguish League of Prevention and of Medico-Social Action
(www.ligue.lu).
66See Doc. parl. no. 4409, supra note 11, at 3-4, 11, 19-21 (agreeing to cooperate with another agency in
1996). The law allows other non-profit agencies to apply to run a state-funded "Service" in the future, see
Law of 8 Dec. 2000, art. 20; Grand-Ducal Order of 12 Oct. 2001, supra note 63, arts. 2-10, but none have
done so thus far.
67 See Law of 8 Dec. 2000, art. 19.
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of interest inherent in the debtor's having chosen the mediator. The Services
perform only the "intake" and "plan development" functions of the system. This
allows them to act more like representatives-perhaps even advocates-for debtors,
presenting their plans to the negotiating center of the system.6 8
Another public entity, the "Mediation Commission," takes charge of the plans
submitted by the Services and negotiates them with creditors. 69 By majority vote of
its six members (ties being broken by the president's vote), the Mediation
Commission can accept a plan as proposed by the Services or modify it before
presenting it to creditors.7 ° Much like the French "commissions on individual
overindebtedness," the Mediation Commission consists of six members with
presumably evenly divided interests. Every three years, the Minster of Families
reappoints the Commission, selecting two members from each of three groups:
representatives of the state (one of whom serves as president), consumer lending
professionals, and consumer debt counseling professionals. 7I Once again, the fact
that the system in Luxembourg is placed largely in the hands of public debt
counselors and the Families Ministry-as opposed to lawyers and the Ministry of
Justice-testifies to legislators' view that the relief offered is primarily in the nature
of "social work."
3.

Debt-Mediator or Service/Commission Controls Stage One

Just like in France, the Belgian debt-mediator or the Luxembourguish Service
and Mediation Commission-not the courts-occupy center stage in this first phase
of the process. The mediator or Service-not the debtor or the debtor's lawyerdraws up a plan and presents it to the debtor and her creditors for approval.7" At this
stage, then, the debtor likely has no advocate or even advisor (although the Service
may perform something like this function in Luxembourg). Perhaps this explains
why so many debtors agree to plans, including some plans that experienced debt
advisers might suggest are overly burdensome and unworkable.
By design,73 the length and content of consensual plans are virtually
unregulated. The demands made on the debtor are limited only by one overarching

68See Grand-Ducal Order of 12 Oct. 2001, supra note 63, arts. 17-19. The Council of State recommended
eliminating this division of labor between Service and Commission. See Doc. parl. no. 4409/07, supra note
11, at 6.
69See Law of 8 Dec. 2000, arts. 3, 5; Grand-Ducal Order of 12 Oct. 2001, supra note 63, art. 19.
70See Grand-Ducal Order of 17 July 2001, M6m. A no. 95, 13 Aug. 2001, p. 1898, arts. 2, 7, availableat
http://www.legilux.public.lu/leg/a/archives/2001/0951308/0951308.pdf?SID=a2bcc51445ae0291d6733bd8f
9afdfbe#page=2.
71 See Law of 8 Dec. 2000, art. 22; Grand-Ducal Order of 17 July 2001, supra note 70, at 4; Ministerial
p. 1032, available at
Order of 10 Sept. 2001, M6m. B, no. 57, 3 Oct. 2001,
(naming the six current
http://www.legilux.public.lu/adm/b/archives/2001/0570310/0570310.pdf#page=3
members).
72See CJ/GW art. 1675/10 §§ 2, 4.
73See Doc. parl. Chambre no. 1073/1, supra note 9, at 36 ("everything is possible").
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requirement-identical in both Belgium and Luxembourg-that the plan allow the
debtor to rehabilitate her financial situation while "guaranteeing [to the debtor and74
her family] that they will be able to lead a life in conformity with human dignity."
The relief offered to debtors is limited only by the requirement that creditors agree
unanimously to the plan (or at least not register a vote against within the time
allotted for voting). 75 This unanimity requirement led some in Belgium to doubt that
consensual plans would be had in many cases, but the proponents insisted that the
fear of a judicially imposed plan would force creditors to compromise.76 As
reported below,77 the optimists appear to have been proven right.
C. Judicial Plans-Payment Plans For All, but To Discharge or Not To
Discharge?

If the mediator or Commission is unable to bring debtor and creditors together
on a consensual plan,7 8 the case continues to the court for consideration of a
judicially imposed payment plan-just like in the French system. 79 It is at this
"judicial plan" stage that the "French-model" systems begin to diverge significantly,
both from each other and from every version of the often-amended system in
France.
In Belgium, the court can impose one of two types of plans. One allows the
court to defer or delay payments and reduce interest rates for up to five years, and
possibly to discharge penalty interest (but not accrued remunerative interest) and
any other penalties and fees. 80 The other, which I will call a "capital-discharge"
plan, allows the court to discharge even the principal claims against the debtor. 81
However, the principal of the debtor's debts can be discharged only in part, only
after the proceeds of the liquidation of the debtor's non-exempt assets have been

14 CJ/GW

arts. 1675/10 § 2, 1675/3; Law of 8 Dec. 2000, art. 1.

71See CJ/GW art. 1675/10 § 4. The German model of "presumed acceptance" was retained in Belgium to

avoid "blockage" by uninterested creditors. See Doc. parl. Chambre no. 1073/1, supra note 9, at 37.
76 See Doc. parl. Chambre no. 1073/11, supra note
1, at 57.
77 See infra Part II.D. One judge reported in 2001 that in "innumerable" cases debtors were willing to
accept plans for ten years or more, and every creditor (except the fisc) agreed, even offering partial
remissions, as their payout in a judicial plan would be significantly less with the five-year limit on judicial
plans.
See
Doc.
parl.
Chambre
(2001-2002)
no.
1285/006,
p.
15,
available at
htt://www.lachambre.be/FLWB/pdf/50/1285/50K 1285006.pdf.
The time limit for the consensual stage differs slightly in Belgium and Luxembourg, but neither system
allows much time. In Belgium, the debt-mediator has only 4 months from her appointment, but she can
abandon the process if it becomes clear before then that unanimity is unobtainable. See CJ/GW art. 1675/11
§ 1. In Luxembourg, the Commission has only 6 months from filing of the petition. See Law of 8 Dec. 2000,
art. 6.
79 Note that the Belgian law directs the mediator to record her observations on the failed consensual
process in the dossier-with the implicit suggestions that recalcitrant creditors will be punished by the court!
80 See CJ/GW art. 1675/12.
81 Except claims not subject to discharge, which are limited to future alimentary obligations, like child
support and alimony (but not present accrued but unpaid obligations), and reparations orders arising from
tortious injury caused by the debtor. See CJ/GW art. 1675/13 § 3.
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applied to her unpaid debts, and only after the debtor has completed a three- to fiveyear payment plan. 82 Moreover, the court can consider a "capital-discharge" plan
only if some kind of five-year payment plan
without a capital discharge would not
83
allow the debtor to pay off her debts in full.
The legislative intent here clearly was that plans not offering capital discharge
would be the norm. The first sentence of the bill introducing the capital discharge
provision assured that "[t]he primary rule is the judicial debt arrangement without
discharge of debt in principal." It goes on to explain, however, that the debtor can
request a capital-discharge plan (such a plan may not be imposed on the debtor) in
"extreme situations," where a partial discharge is necessary to permit the
elaboration of a viable plan.84 On the one hand, the Belgian law reflects a clear
continuation of the French discomfort with discharging unpaid debt. On the other
hand, it evidences a rapidly emerging European acceptance of economic reality:
Debtors can be realistically expected to pay only so much, and creditors must be
prepared to give a little, too.
In Luxembourg, the court is more restricted-the debtor is never required to sell
her assets, and the court is never allowed to discharge any debt other than penalties
and fees. The original bill had allowed the court to impose any relief in a judicial
plan that the service could propose to creditors in a consensual plan, including full
discharge of the capital of all unpaid debts. 85 The Chamber of Commerce opposed
vigorously any discharge of debt without creditor consent.86 The Council of State
recommended adopting the approach of Belgian law, but its discussion of that law
contained a striking omission. The Council explained that "[t]he Belgian law
provides for four types of measures," it enumerated the measures for a non-capitaldischarge plan (from section 1675/12 of the Belgian Judicial Code), and it
recommended adoption of the substance of that provision of the Belgian law. 87 The
Council did not even mention, however, that the very next provision (article
1675/13) of the Belgian law also provided for afifth measure: a "capital-discharge"
plan. The record contains no explanation for this oversight-if it was an

82 See id. art. 1675/13. In the original bill, the government admitted that, as in Germany, France, and the

U.S., "the majority of overindebted persons have hardly any assets to distribute to their creditors." Doc. parl.
Chambre no. 1073/1, supra note 9, at 12; Doc. parl. Chambre no. 1073/11, supra note 1, at 26.
83See CJ/GW arts. 1675/13 § 1, 1675/3.
84See Doc. parl. Chambre no. 1073/1, supra note 9, at 44.
85See Doc. parl. no. 4409, supra note 11, at 8-9 (proposed art. 24).
86See Doc. parl. no. 4409/05, supra note 28, at 8. The Justices of the Peace of Luxembourg joined this
opposition. See Doc. parl. no. 4409/06, p. 3, available at http://www.chd.lu/servlet/Merge?lot=J-1998-O0529&lib=chdl.
87 I say "the substance" because the language is slightly different, but the Council's discussion clearly
indicates that it proposed exactly what the Belgian law provided. See Doc. parl. no. 4409/07, supra note 11,
at 13.
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oversight-but the relevant committee 88 and ultimately the legislature adopted the
Council's restrictive "compromise" position with no questions asked.
Though courts in Luxembourg cannot impose a discharge of debt, they can
recommend that the state finance a sort of indirect "discharge" to certain debtors
under a unique "creditor welfare"-like system, described below in Part III.A. Once
again, the French distaste for imposed discharge is apparent on the law, but statefinanced functional "discharges" have proved relatively common in recent practice.
1. The Big Question: How Long is Long Enough?
Like in France and other European states, a payment plan of considerable
duration is an absolute prerequisite to court-imposed debt relief for consumers in
both Belgium and Luxembourg. The mandated length of the plan differs in the two
systems, however, although both systems limit plan duration much more so than
does the French law. The legislative history of the Belgian law reveals a
particularly sensitive and unique consideration of the minimum and maximum plan
duration. A closer look at the history of the laws in Belgium and Luxembourg
reveals just how arbitrary the decision about plan duration can ultimately be.
In Luxembourg, a judicial plan can require payments from the debtor for no
longer than seven years. The law allows no exceptions (for mortgage debt, for
89
example) and offers no indication of what the "average" plan length should be.
The government incorporated this seven-year term into its original bill, explaining
that this limit was "absolutely indispensable" to "motivate the debtor to collaborate
actively" in the plan process. 90 The government offered no explanation for why
seven years, rather than some shorter period, as in the Belgian law, had been
chosen. The legislative record contains no challenge to and virtually no discussion
of this long time frame. The final committee report notes simply that the fixation of
the maximum duration at seven years "results evidently from a political assessment"
and that "[e]xperience will show whether this duration corresponds effectively to
actual needs." 91 Oddly enough, apparently no one thought to mention that the
German system originally required a seven-year repayment period,92as well, though
the arbitrary choice of seven years was heavily criticized there, too.
In contrast, legislators in Belgium wrestled mightily with the question of how
long to demand that debtors live under such plans. In the 1996 bill that ultimately
became the Belgian law, the government proposed a duration of seven years for all
plans. It explained that the plan should not be so long as to discourage the debtor,

88See Doc. parl. no. 4409/08, available at http://www.chd.lu/servlet/Merge?lot=J-1999-O-0439&lib=chdl;
Doc. parl. no. 4409/11, supra note 11, at 16.
89See Law of 8 Dec. 2000, art. 14
90See Doc. parl. no. 4409, supra note 11, at 8-9, 16 (proposed art. 24 and commentary on art. 24).
91 Doc. parl. no. 4409/11, supra note 11, at 16.
92See Kilborn, supra note 3, at 282-83 & n.161.
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given the privations to which the debtor would be subjected over the life of the plan,
but it offered scant explanation of why seven years-rather than four, which had
been proposed in an earlier bil193-would be the right choice. The bill and the
subsequent House report suggested simply that any shorter period might not allow a
maximum number of debtors to achieve the goals of the law-to pay off their debts
during the plan.94

Among the first proposed amendments to the bill was one to reduce the
maximum plan duration to four years, on the matter-of-fact basis that "seven years
seems excessive." 95 Finally, a second series of proposed amendments suggested a
five-year limit, which was ultimately adopted. Though other proposed amendments
to the duration limit were advanced and fiercely defended, the legislative history
oddly contains no discussion of the reason why the 96committee and the full
legislature ultimately adopted the "five-year compromise.
Perhaps five years was chosen because it was supported by a particularly cogent
justification focusing on the debtor's perspective (as opposed to maximizing returns
to creditors). Proponents of the five-year maximum plan duration rationalized this
choice in terms of the debtor's demonstrating worthiness for relief. They proposed
curtly but convincingly that "[i]t is reasonable to think that a delay of 5 years is
sufficient to prove the willingness of the overindebted person to make a serious
effort."97
In other words, quid pro quo, but enough is enough. If five years is not enough
to pay all debts, the debtor has proven her worthiness for a discharge of any
remaining claims. Indeed, a five-year limit probably also reflects the reality of how
long many creditors realistically will pursue a defaulted debt. After five years of
non-payment, most debts will be abandoned and written off, discharged "de facto"
if not "dejure."
The duration of a plan that discharges debts in principal (available only in
Belgium) differs in two important respects. First, a "non-capital discharge" plan
can extend beyond the five-year limit to allow the debtor more time to pay off longterm debt, primarily mortgage debt. 98 A "capital-discharge" plan may not exceed

93See Doc. parl. Chambre no. 274/3, supra note 9, at 118. In discussions of this earlier proposal, the royal
union of credit institutions had argued that 7 years was the minimum that would allow viable full-payment
plans while respecting debtors' human dignity. See id. at 49.
94See Doc. parl. Chambre no. 1073/1, supra note 9, at 10, 42; Doc. parl. Chambre no. 1073/11, supra note
1, at 6.
95
Doc.

parl.
Chambre
(1996-1997)
no.
1073/2,
p.
4,
available
at
http://www.lachambre.be/FLWB/pdf/49/lO73/49Kl073002.pdf. The argument that 7 is years is just "too
long" appears again and again. See, e.g., Doc. parl. Chambre no. 1073/11, supra note 1,at 10.
See Doc. parl. Chambre no. 1073/11, supra note 1, at 69, 70, 83, 127-28; CJ/GW art. 1675/12 § 2.
9
Doc.
parl.
Chambre
(1996-1997)
no.
1073/3,
p.
4,
available
at
htt://www.lachambre.be/FLWB/pdf/49/1073/49K 1073003.pdf.
Like in France, the plan can extend for five years plus 50% of the remaining term of any outstanding
long-term debts. See CJ/GW arts. 1675/12 § 2.
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five years. 99 In the bill introducing the new law, the government made it quite clear
that debtors who could not pay off their mortgage loans in a five-year plan should
sell their homes and find other, more affordable housing.1°°
Second, the Belgian law imposes a floor as well as a ceiling on the duration of a
capital-discharge plan. Not only must the debtor prove her worthiness for any relief
by living under a payment plan for up to five years, she must additionally prove her
worthiness for the extraordinaryrelief of capital discharge by submitting to a plan
for at least three years.' 0'
A proposal to eliminate this minimum period arose immediately in the House
on the basis that it seemed "incomprehensible that the legislator could oblige a
debtor

.

. .

to continue to live in this situation [of financial distress] for three years,

even in the case where no debt could be completely paid off."1 2 Other proposals to
reduce the minimum to one year were advanced on similar grounds. 0 3 Both the
House and Senate roundly rejected all such proposals, however, explaining that
reducing or eliminating the minimum would "compromise the equilibrium" of the
law.' °4 Perhaps the recent implementation in France of the "personal recovery"
procedure, with immediate discharge for low-income debtors, portends an eventual
softening of the Belgian position, but the government appears unwilling to move in
this direction yet.
The theory seems to be that, even if a "purely symbolic" three-year plan will
produce little for creditors, it will evidence (and perhaps inculcate) the social
responsibility that the modem open-credit economy demands of consumers seeking
the "ultimate" economic relief. How to pay for a system that produces no returns
for creditors is a more troubling question, and the unique Belgian response is
addressed in Part III.B., below.
2.

Squeezing Blood From a Tumip?-Debt Payment v. "Human Dignity"

In both Belgium and Luxembourg, the overarching restriction on what any plan
may demand is stated simply and vaguely: debtors and their families must be
guaranteed the ability "to lead a life in conformity with human dignity."'0 5 These

9 Cf id. art. 1675/13 § 2.
0oSee Doc. parl. Chambre no. 1073/1, supra note 9, at 46.
01 See Doc. par. Srnat no. 929/5, supra note 9, at 48.
102Doc. parl. Chambre no. 1073/2, supra note 95, at 5-6; see also Doc. parl. Srnat no. 929/3, supra note
10, at 7 (same proposal in the Senate, also rejected without discussion).
103 See
Doc.
parl Chambre
(1996-1997)
no.
1073/10,
p.
8,
available at
http://www.lachambre.be/FLWB/pdf/49/1073/49KI073010.pdf; Doc. parl. S~nat no. 929/3, supra note 10, at
7.
104 See Doc. parl. Chambre no. 1073/11, supra note 1, at 83, 128; Doc. parl. Srnat no. 929/5, supra note
9,
at 47-48.
105See CJ/GW arts. 1675/3, 1675/12 § 4, 1675/13 § 5; Law of 8 Dec. 2000, art. 1. The Belgian law had to
proceed from this baseline, as the Belgian Constitution establishes this basic right as a generally applicable
proposition. See CONST. BELG. art. 23 ("Everyone has the right to lead a life in conformity with human
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new laws inexplicably reject the French (and German) approach of fixing a clear
maximum payment of all non-exempt income.
The law in Luxembourg
intentionally leaves this vague standard open for discretionary judicial
interpretation.' 0 6 Belgian legislators defined slightly more specific restrictions on
judicial plans.
In the Belgian law, at least in the context of judicial plans, "human dignity" is
"defined" in terms of three levels of protection: First, like in every other system,
tangible property that is exempt outside bankruptcy is exempt in bankruptcy, as
well.' 0 7 The law requires liquidation of the debtor's assets prior to the establishment
of a capital-discharge plan, but only those assets that are "seizable" (non-exempt).
As we will see below, a judicial plan may derogate from protections for future
income, but it may not reduce any protection of the debtor's tangible property. The
law as ultimately adopted holds the property0 8exemptions sacrosanct, a sort of
absolute baseline for preserving human dignity.'
Second, on the central issue of how much future payment to demand of debtors,
the Belgian law is ambivalent about incorporating the generally applicable law
exempting certain levels of income from seizure. Without saying so directly, the
provisions on judicial plans seem to assume that, as in France and Germany, general
income exemptions serve as an initial "human dignity" fund into which the judge
should not dip to reach for more payments to creditors.
What these provisions do clearly say, however, is that the judge may deviate
from general income protections (in cases both with and without capital discharge)
"by specially motivated decision."' 9 The legislative history suggests several
possible motivations for dipping into generally exempt income, such as the debtor's
light family-related burden (although the exemptions are based on household
makeup), the debtor's spouse's level of exempt income, or "the relative size of debts
and income."' 1° One legislator doubted how a plan that derogated from income
exemptions could preserve human dignity when these exemptions were designed
precisely to ensure a minimal level of human dignity. The House and Senate
brushed aside this concern. The Belgian Parliament accepted the government
explanation that public debt counselors often proposed out-of-court arrangements
that dipped into exempt income. The government explained that, in many cases, a
dignity."). The legislature in Luxembourg borrowed this notion from Belgian law. See Doc. parl. no.
4409/11, supra note 11, at 11.
106See Doc. parl. no. 4409/11, supra note 11, at 11 (stating simply that this approach is "preferable" to
identifying a minimum figure, such as the "minimum guaranteed revenue" established by law in
Luxembourg).
107The list of exempt assets in Belgium is very similar to the list in Germany, France, and moderately
generous U.S. states-basically, household items and tools of the debtor's trade. See CJ/GW art. 1408.
108The bill as originally proposed would have allowed the judge to derogate from property exemptions,
just as it allows derogation from income exemptions. See Doc. parl. Chambre no. 1073/10, supra note 103,
at 10; Doc. parl. Chambre no. 1073/11, supra note 1, at 71, 85.
109CJ/GW arts. 1675/12 § 4, 1675/13 § 5.
110Doc. parl. Chambre no. 1073/1, supra note 9, at 43; Doc. parl. Chambre no. 1073/11, supra note 1, at
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viable and agreeable plan could be created only by ceding some exempt income to
creditors. The 10-15,000 francs (about 250- 370, $300-$450) per month that
separated the income exemption levels from the bare-minimum "existence
minimum" (discussed below) constituted the "make or break" investment for many
plans."'
To appreciate the impact of invading exempt income, one must understand how
generous Belgian income exemptions can be, especially after they were
substantially increased in 1993.112 Like the laws of other European states, Belgian
law exempts most low-level income and exempts less and less of higher incomes.
For 2005, 100% of an individual's monthly income up to 889 (about $1100) is
exempt, while 100% of monthly income above 1152 is available to creditors.
Income between these two amounts is subject to a sliding scale of protection,
ranging from 80% exemption at the bottom to 60% at the top.113 Thus, every
individual is guaranteed a minimum absolutely exempt amount of 10,668 per year
(about $13,500). After subtracting the non-exempt portions reserved for creditors,
single childless debtors earning at least 1152 per month can shield from creditors
only an absolute maximum of 1071 per month (about $16,000 per year). Note,
however, that these limits are doubled for two-breadwinner households, and they
are increased by 54 per month for each dependent child. So, the income of a
double-income household might be 100% exempt up to 21,336 per year (about
$26,500), and if they have one or more children, up to 22,000 per year (about
$27,500). At least for two-member households in which both members are
employed, Belgian law protects quite a pool of income, which legislators felt they
had to make available to judges if there was to be any hope of creating viable plans
in most cases. Of course, French exemption levels are quite similar, and French
legislators have established exempt income as an inviolable budget for debtors since
1999. Time will tell whether the Belgian approach will face the very problems that
the 1999 French revision attempted to solve.
Third and finally, rather than using exempt income as the absolutely inviolable
floor, as in the French system, Belgian legislators lowered the floor significantly. If
judges were to be allowed to derogate from exempt income, the last bastion of
human dignity would be the level of income established by the law of 7 August

111
See Doc. parl. Chambre no. 1073/2, supra note 95, at 6; Doc. parl. Chambre no. 1073/10, supra note
103, at 8; Doc. parl. Chambre no. 1073/11, supra note 1, at 71-72, 85; Doc. parl. Snat no. 929/5, supra note
9, at 12.
112See Doc. parl. Chambre no. 274/3, supra note 9, at 33 (noting the increase per the law of 14 January
1993).
13 For 2005, 20% of income between 889.01 and 954 is subject to seizure, 30% between 954.01 and
1053, and 40% between 1053.01 and 1152. The Judicial Code makes varying levels of income exempt
from either voluntary cession or involuntary seizure, and these levels are amended annually each November
by Royal Order to reflect fluctuations in the consumer price index. See CJ/GW arts. 1409-12. The levels for
2005 were established by Royal Order of 9 Dec. 2004, M.B. 15 Dec. 2004 (ed. 2), p. 84449.

2006]

EMERGING CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY SYSTEMS

1974 "instituting the right to a minimum of means of existence."' 1 4 Called the
"revenue of [social] integration" since mid-2002, the absolute floor of income that

all judicial plans must leave to debtors rises slightly every year," 5 but it remains
painfully low. For plans adopted after October 2004, all judicial plans must leave a
minimum income of about 7450 per year (about $9300) to singles living alone and
about 9950 per year (about $12,500) to most other debtors (including all married
couples with any number of children).'1 16 The "revenue of integration" hardly seems
to ensure a life of human dignity for virtually any debtor, but particularly for
families with children. In 1999, the year in which the poverty level was last
published, the poverty level in Belgium for a couple with two children was
1493
17
per month- 17,916/yr.-or almost double the "revenue of integration."
I searched in vain for any indication of the degree to which judges invade
exempt income in forging judicial plans. A 2004 survey of debt-mediators in
southern Belgium indicated that 35% of administered cases had involved payments
from exempt income-with no indication, however, of the proportion of consensual
and judicial plans or of the extent of exempt income used.' 18 The mediators who
responded to the survey explained that the plans had derogated from income
exemptions primarily for two reasons: to enable a viable plan to be negotiated, or to
limit the length of a plan. The full results of that survey, reported below, suggest
that the Belgian mediators and courts are balancing the demands of creditors and
the needs of debtors fairly well so far, but the statute sets quite a low theoretical
floor of "human dignity."
3. "De-responsible-ization"and Discharge-"Part" or "Most"?

114

See CJ/GW arts 1675/12 § 4, 1675/13 § 5. The amount of this existence minimum had risen gradually

over the years, and it was raised one last time by Royal Order of 24 December 2001, M.B. 29 Dec. 2001, ed.
2, p. 45538, to the level from which it would be continued under a different name-the "revenue of social
integration"-pursuant to the law of 26 May 2002 "concerning the right to social integration," art. 14, M.B.
31 July 2002, p. 33610, 33613. The new 2002 "social integration" law abrogated the 1974 "minimum means
of existence" law, see Law of 26 May 2002, art. 54, M.B. 31 July 2002, p. 33621, but the notion and amount
of a minimum income level continues essentially unchanged for the purpose of the consumer debt
arrangement law.
15 See Law of 26 May 2002, art. 15, M.B. 31 July 2002, p. 33610, 33613 (tying revenue of integration to
consumer price index, base 103.14 as of 1 June 1999). A Royal Order increased the base rates for 2005 and
will increase them further for 2006 and 2007. See Royal Order of 3 Sept. 2004, arts. 1-2, M.B. 27 Sept.
2004, p. 69308, 69309.
116These amounts are not increased if the debtor has more children who represent the third or fourth, etc.,
member of the family. I arrived at these numbers by increasing the higher base rates in the 3 September 2004
Royal Order by the percent change in the consumer price index from 103.14, the number established as the
base index in art. 15 of the 26 May 2002 law on social integration, and calculating the October index, as art.
15 requires, in accordance with the law of 2 August 1971, M.B. 20 Aug. 1971, art. 4, § 1. For future changes
in the consumer price index, see the heading "tconomie, La conjoncture" on the Belgian statistical agency's
website at http://statbel.fgov.be/pub/homefr.asp?x= I 4&y=5.
117See OCE REPORT, supra note 61, at 23.
18

" See id. at 22.
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The question of whether or not to undermine credit contracts and discharge
unpaid debts has produced perhaps the deepest divisions in the European debate
about what to do for overindebted consumers. The experiences in Belgium and
Luxembourg continued this trend. Both of these states' laws accepted the notion
that some debtors would be unable to pay off their debts, but both mitigated
concerns about discharging unpaid debt through interesting legislative
compromises. The law in Luxembourg allows for no discharge per se, but
Luxembourg's innovative approach to indirectly freeing debtors from claims is
described below in Part III.A.
In Belgium, concerns about undermining the "security of contracts" and
warnings of general "dgresponsabilisation"of consumers appear immediately and
persistently in the legislative history of the new law.1 19 The Prime Minister, for
example, fought the notion of discharge of capital from the beginning. 12 But as one
member of a discussion committee remarked early on, just because some consumers
might be "de-responsible-ized," that is insufficient reason to deprive all debtors of
the possibility of relief through discharge. In addition, early comparative observers
pointed out that the absence of a judicial discharge in the French law had reduced
the effectiveness of that system.121 The government ultimately relented,
acknowledging that there could be no room for argument about "de-responsible22
ization" in light of the strict conditions of a judicial payment plan with discharge.'
After all, even opponents of discharge pointed out that remission already occurs de
facto, as creditors commonly write off bad debts when
they realize that legal
23
impractical.1
or
impossible
collection
make
restrictions

19 See, e.g., Doc. parl. Chambre no. 274/3, supra note 9, at 41-42, 50 (warning of a movement into a
"culture of overindebtedness," noting that the "American example is striking in this regard," and explaining
that U.S. law is designed to encourage risk-taking, which is unjustifiable in the context of a household
economy); Doc. parl. Chambre no. 1073/11, supra note 1, at 9, 15-16, 20, 77. The notion of "de-responsibleization"-and the French word-appear in the legislative record in Luxembourg, as well. See Doc. parl. no.
3813, Ddbat, supra note 9, at 217; Doc. parl. no. 4409, supra note 11, at 11 (commentary on art. 5).
120See, e.g., Doc. parl. Chambre no. 274/3, supra note 9, at 122-23, 140 (citing the U.S. example and
warning of diresponsabilisation).The finance ministry in particular opposed categorically any forced
remission of debts to the public fisc, citing art. 172 of Belgian Constitution, which establishes that only a law
can moderate a tax obligations, not a judicial plan or order. See Doc. parl. Chambre no. 274/3, supra note 9,
at 71-72. The Prime Minister consistently rejected this notion, see id. at 121. In the first few years of the
new law, the fisc and the social security administration undermined the consensual system by systematically
refusing to agree to any sort of remission of debt. See, e.g., Doc. parl. Chambre no. 1285/006, supra note 77,
at 5-7, 14-17. Internal guidelines forbid state agencies to consent to any sort of discharge plan with debtors.
See id. at 15. The latest reform proposal expressly allows state creditors to agree to a remission, thus
attempting to fix this problem. See Doe. parl. Chambre (2003-2004) no. 1309/001, pp. 16-17, 53-54,
available at http://www.lachambre.be/FLWB/pdf/51/1309/51K1309001.pdf.
121See Doc. parl. Chambre no. 274/3, supra note 9, at 56-57, 123. As noted above, the French law now
provides for a judicially imposed remission (discharge) of debt in certain cases.
122See Doc. parl. Chambre no. 1073/1, supra note 9, at 44-45; cf Doc. parl. Chambre no. 1073/11, supra
note 1, at 78.
123See Doc. parl. Chambre no. 274/3, supra note 9, at 17.
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This reticence about allowing discharge was never fully overcome, however.
Though willing to accept the notion of a discharge of debt, legislators insisted that it
be limited to extreme cases of last resort.1 24 And just like their French and German
counterparts, Belgian lawmakers fiercely rejected the U.S. notion of an immediate
discharge and the undermining effect they perceived it as having on consumer
responsibility. Legislators insisted that "[imn no case will the remission [discharge]
of debts be unconditional. In all cases, the advantages that it procures
will only be
' 25
able to be acquired if the debtor respects the plan of arrangement."'
Indeed, discharge is conditioned not only on the debtor's fulfilling a payment
plan, but on the debtor's material situation not "returning to better fortune" before
the end of the plan term. 126 One legislator warned that this vague notion of "return
to better fortune" should be clarified in the statute to avoid the vicissitudes of
varying jurisprudence, 127 but this warning went unheeded. The government
explained that this language was intended to deny a discharge only to debtors who
had enjoyed a "fundamental" windfall, such as winning the lottery or receiving a
large inheritance; i.e., a fortunate event that allowed the debtor to pay off all of her
remaining debts quickly. So long as the debtor's material situation had not enjoyed
such a "serious amelioration"1 28within the plan period, the government explained, the
discharge should be allowed.
Moreover, the law as current written seems to allow the judge to order only a
partialdischarge-not a total discharge. 129 Immediately questions arose about those
debtors whose meager income would allow for no substantial repayment of debt.
Would these debtors remain forever encumbered by the portion of their debts
remaining after a "partial" discharge? The government's response remained
consistent and unambiguous: In such extreme situations, the judge should order a
"quasi-total discharge," such as a "partial" discharge leaving only a nominal debt,
like one franc. In such cases, the plan would retain only a "symbolic character,"
with the debtor simply demonstrating worthiness for discharge by living under the
plan conditions and furnishing an effort to pay her debts.' 30 The government insisted

124 See, e.g., Doc. parl. Chambre no. 1073/11, supra note 1, at 15.
125Doc. parl. Chambre no. 274/3, supra note 9, at 96.
126See CJ/GW art. 1675/13 § 1.
127See Doc. parl. Chambre no. 1073/11, supra note 1, at 15,
. See Doc. parl. Chambre no. 274/3, supra note 9, at 123; Doc. parl. Chambre no. 1073/1,
supra note 9,
at 46; Doc. parl. Chambre no. 1073/11, supra note 1, at 75-76.
129 See CJ/GW art. 1675/13 § 1 ("[T]he judge may order any other partial remission of debts, even in
capital, on the following conditions .... ") (emphasis added). In the very first proposals, total discharge was
envisioned for "the most inextricable cases of overindebtedness." See Doc. parl. Chambre no. 274/3, supra
note 9, at 96-97. But the 1996 government bill that ultimately became the final law mentions only partial
discharge-offering no explanation of where the total discharge language went, even though the
government's discussion of the bill continued to mention total discharge. Compare Doc. parl. Chambre no.
1073/1, supra note 9, at 11 (total or partial remission) with id. at 103 (setting out new art. 1675/13, which
now allowed only partial discharge) and Doc. parl. Chambre no. 1073/11, supra note 1, at 6 (still mentioning
total discharge late in the discussion of the bill).
130 See Doc. parl. Chambre no. 1073/1, supra note 9, at 44.
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that "it goes without saying that, at the conclusion of a plan containing the measures
provided in article 1675/13 [the capital-discharge provision], the debtor will no
longer be held to the payment of his debts. At the conclusion of this plan, the
debtor is incontestably liberated from his debts ....431
Apparently, the lower courts disagreed with the government, but the Belgian
constitutional court finally settled the issue in line with the government's assurances
of the availability of "quasi-total" discharges. Many courts instituted a minimum
required payout for debtors to be eligible for a capital-discharge plan, and debtors
unable to make the required minimum payment were thus unable to seek effective
relief under the new law. 32 In April 2003, the Belgian constitutional court (the
Court of Arbitration) 133 held that limiting relief to those debtors who could pay a
substantial portion of their debt violated the equality provisions of the Belgian
Constitution. The Court held that insufficient income could not justify refusing to
construct a plan that would ultimately discharge all of the debtor's pre-petition
debt--despite the language of the law authorizing only "partial" discharge.' 34 The
Court thus essentially read the word "partial" out the law. It relied instead on the
government's insistence
in the legislative history about the possibility of "quasi1 35
discharges.
total"
D. Initial Experience With Consensualand Judicial Plans:A Pan-EuropeanTrend
Limited statistics describe the first six years of consumer "bankruptcy" practice
in Belgium and three years in Luxembourg.
Though these statistics offer
insufficient foundation for "hard" conclusions, the experience of Belgium and
Luxembourg seems to have continued the general European trend toward more
generous treatment of debtors in terms of both budget and relief. Consensual plans

See Doc. parl. Srnat no. 929/5, supra note 9, at 46-47 (emphasis added).
This same "local legal culture"

'3'

132 See, e.g., http://www.dignitas.be/fr/le-regelement-collectif.php.

problem has plagued U.S. practice under chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code for years. See Jean Braucher,
Lawyers and Consumer Bankruptcy: One Code, Many Cultures, 67 AM. BANKR. L.J. 501, 532, 546-47,
550-51 (1993) (revealing that the Bankruptcy Court in San Antonio, TX, required chapter 13 plans to offer
100% payment to creditors, but in Austin, TX, only 25-33%, in Cincinnati, OH, 70%, but in Dayton, OH,
only 10%).
13 See http://www.arbitrage.be/fr/presentation/presentation institutions.html.
134 See Order No. 38/2003 (Apr. 3, 2003), available at http://www.arbitrage.be/public/f/2003/2003038f.pdf.
135See CJ/GW art. 1675/12 § 3. On April 5, 2003-two days after the Court released its decision-the
Belgian government initiated discussion of a reform proposal to amend the law to allow for total discharge,
but the proposal stands firm on requiring even totally impecunious debtor to undergo a three-year minimum
plan. See Doc. parl. Chambre no. 1309/001, supra note 120, at 19-21, 53-54; Compte Rendu Integral,
Commissions,
No.
030,
at
4
(Oct.
21,
2003),
available
at
http://www.lachambre.be/doc/CCRI/pdf/51/icO3O.pdf. Belgian lawmakers have consistently rejected
proposals to eliminate this "purely symbolic" waiting period for debtors with no disposable income. See,
e.g.,
Doc
parl.
Chambre
(2003-2004)
no.
199/001,
pp.
15-16,
available
at
http://www.lachambre.be/FLWB/pdf/51/0199/51KO199001.pdf. The government deposited its pending
reform bill before the House on July 28, 2004.

20061

EMERGING CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY SYSTEMS

continue to emerge from the majority of administered cases, and unfortunately little
data exist on the content of these plans. The few available indicators suggest that
plans in Belgium are allocating meager but sufficient budgets to debtors, although
many stretch out over far more years than debtors are likely able to bear. Many
plans in Luxembourg, in contrast, are ending successfully long before the statutory
seven-year maximum term. As for the "ultimate relief," the "French" courts of
southern Belgium seem even more willing than their counterparts in France to
impose a discharge, though I could find no reports from the "Dutch" courts of
northern Belgium. Though the law in Luxembourg provides for no "official"
discharge, Part IlI.A. reveals how debtors there are achieving the functional
equivalent.
1. Belgium: Rising Filings, Long Waits, and Moderately Demanding Plans
A general dearth of statistical data in all areas has been described derisively as a
"tradition" in Belgium. 36 Luckily, the National Bank of Belgium is in charge of the
national consumer credit reporting database, which includes data on all consumer
"bankruptcy" filings. 37 The Bank reports only aggregate data, offering no
information on, for example, the specific content of consensual or judicial plans or
the proportion of judicial plans with and without a capital discharge. The Bank's
latest report 138 does indicate three important statistical trends:
First, formal requests for relief have risen by about 1000 in almost every year
since implementation of the new law six years ago. At just over 8000 in 2003 and
just over 9250 in 2004, though, filings remain quite modest-about 9 filings per
10,000 residents.' 39 This hardly compares with the over 1.6 million non-business
filings in the U.S. in 2003-about 55 filings per 10,000 U.S. residents-or even the
166,000 consumer filings in 2003 in France-about 27 filings per 10,000 residents
of France.1 40 Of course, returning to where this paper began, debt levels in Belgium
are, on average, quite low.
A shift in the makeup of the consumer debt portfolio in Belgium, however, may
herald a coming upswing in filings. From 2000 to 2004, the total number of
consumer installment loans (mainly from banks) in default fell 14.5% from 235,846
to 201,693, while the number of defaults on consumer "lines of credit" (ouvertures

136 See, e.g., Doc. parl. Chambre no. 1073/11, supra note 1, at 19.
37 See http://www.nbb.be/pub/06_000000_00/06-06 00 00_00/06 06 010000.htm?l=en&t=ho.
138 See BANQUE NATIONAL DE BELGIQUE, CENTRALE DES CREDITS AUX PARTICULIERS, STATISTIQUES

(2005), available at http://www.nbb.be/doc/cr/Publications/BROCKPSTAT2005_06F.pdf [hereinafter NBB
STATISTICS].
139
See

id.
at
31
tbl.2.4.2;
CIA,
THE
WORLD
FACT
BOOK,
available at
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/be.html (estimating total population in Belgium as of July
2005 at 10,364,388).
140 See Kilbom, supra note 12. According to the CIA World Factbook, the age structure (and hence the
likely population of adult debtors) of each of these three countries is comparable, with about four-fifths of
the population over age 14.
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de criditkredietopeningen)-theequivalent of a revolving credit card account,
mainly offered by non-banks-rose 33.4% from 150,604 to 200,908. At the end of
2004, over 3 million of these "lines of credit" had been opened, with a total
available limit of over 8 billion Euros, while only 1.4 million installment loans
4
remained outstanding with a total loan amount of just over 18 billion Euros.1 1
While installment loans generally will be retired by the expiration of a relatively
short fixed term, "lines of credit" remain open indefinitely. Moreover, unlike in the
installment loan application process, the consumer's creditworthiness is not
scrutinized upon each draw on one of these "lines of credit." Thus, Belgian
consumers seem to be moving toward potentially uncontrolled and perpetual
indebtedness through a device that has seen a marked rise in defaults over the past
several years and has contributed so famously to the "culture of consumption" and
excessive debt in the U.S.
Second, a very large proportion of Belgian cases seem to be delayed for years
after the decision of admissibility, or they are falling off the radar entirely. From
entry into force of the new law on January 1, 1999, to the end of 2004, a total of
41,207 cases had been deemed admissible by the court and registered in the Bank's
consumer credit database. 142 Of these, only 16,918--only 41%- had concluded
with a consensual or judicial plan by the end of 2004.14 3 Thus, in just under 60% of
cases, either the debtors are abandoning the process or the mediators and courts are
delaying the cases for extended periods. 44 The courts appear to bear much of the
blame for these delays. Some courts have reportedly returned cases to the failed
consensual stage multiple times (which the law does not seem to permit) or
continued the judicial plan proceedings for up to 3 years.145 To the courts' credit, the
proportion of total cases admitted in each year to the number of confirmed
consensual or judicial plans grew steadily in every year but 2004. In 1999, only
about 8% of the 4542 cases admitted that year concluded with a plan of one sort or
another, 146 but that percentage grew steadily to almost 52% in 2003 before falling
back to 47% in 2004.147 The large backlog of cases admitted in previous years
appears to account for most of the plans executed in later years, but at least the
numbers of initial "successes" are rising.

141See NBB STATISTICS, supra note 138, at 11-12, 18.
1421 could find no statistics at all on the rate of rejection (orders of inadmissibility) of consumer cases, but
I suspect the rate is very low, like in France, no more than 10%, and probably much lower.
143See NBB STATISTICS, supra note 138, at 31 tbl.2.4.1, 32.
144Recall that the statutory maximum delay at the consensual stage is 4 months. See CJ/GW art. 1675/11 §
1.
I145
See OCE REPORT, supra note 61, at 20, 33 (reporting delays in some cases of I to 2 years between
filing and implementation of a plan); BERTEL DE GROOTE, ACTUELE VRAAGSTUKKEN BRETREFFENDE DE
COLLECTIEVE SCHULDENREGELING § 7 (2004).
'46 For 1999 figures, see BANQUE NATIONAL DE BELGIQUE, CENTRALE DES CREDITS AUX PARTICULIERS,

STATISTIQUES 32-33 & tbls.3.4.1, 3.4.2 (2004) [hereinafter NBB 1999 STATISTICS].
147See NBB STATISTICS, supra note 138, at 31 tbl.2.4.2.
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Third, legislators correctly predicted that Belgian creditors would agree to
consensual plans for fear of smaller returns in judicial plans. Continuing the trend
in France, consensual plans represent approximately 70% of all plans confirmed in
Belgium in the first six years of the new law.148 Due to the delays described above,
however, as a percentage of total admitted cases, the numbers are less impressive.
Of the 41,207 total cases admitted from 1999 to 2004, 11,739 (28.5%) have
concluded with a confirmed consensual plan. 49 This percentage is pulled down by
early delays, though, and the rate of conclusion of consensual plans has risen
steadily over the past five years. In 1999, only 5.8% of the cases admitted that year
concluded with a consensual plan, but that proportion jumped to 22% in 2000 and
climbed steadily to 34.8% in 2003 before falling slightly to 33.8% in 2004. The
intermediation of the central bank was not apparently necessary, as it was in France,
to spur Belgian creditors into accepting consensual plans, but as discussed below, a
substantial number of these consensual plans may be destined for failure.
These aggregate statistics offer some interesting information, but the most
significant question remains unanswered: How will these plans perform?
Unfortunately, the national data offer no information on the content of these plans
or the extent to which the courts are or are not preserving "human dignity" with
plans that demand more sacrifice than debtors can reasonably bear. Getting a
consensual or judicial plan in place is only the first step--the debtor has to live
under the plan for many years to receive the needed relief. Real "success" cannot
be declared when plans are confirmed, but only when the plans are completed. One
clear trend in Europe is the lack of follow-up on confirmed plans. We need to know
how the plans are doing to gauge whether the system is really effective or not, and
very little data is gathered to measure this.
What little evidence one can find in public sources suggests that the initial
"success" represented by the high percentage of confirmed consensual plans may
well lead to a future of troubling failure. For example, the private Observatory of
Credit and Indebtedness conducted an admittedly "unscientific" survey in May and
June 2004 of 40 debt-mediators in the southern, French half of Belgium and the
Brussels region. 5( The survey results indicated that the average duration of
consensual plans was just under 82 months (6 years, 10 months)-well over the five
years prescribed for judicial plans.15 1 In an October 2001 letter to the Belgian House

48 See NBB 1999 STATISTICS, supra note 146, at 33 & tbl.3.4.2; NBB STATISTICS, supra note 138, at 31

tbl.2.4.2.
149See NBB STATISTICS, supra note 138, at 30, 31 tbl.2.4.2.
150Although the sample focused only on the French-speaking southern part of Belgium, the results of this
survey are likely relatively representative. Of the total admitted cases and confirmed consensual and judicial
plans, just short of half in every category come from regions in Wallonia and Brussels (the area surveyed).
See NBB STATISTICS, supra note 138, at 30 tbl.2.4. 1. Unfortunately, the few Dutch websites of debt
counseling agencies and consumer centers in Flanders, such as the Vereniging van Vlaamse Steden en
Gemeenten (http://www.vvsg.be/index.shtml), Steunpunt Algemeen Welzijnswerk (http://www.caw.be/),
and Verbrauchersatelje (http://www.verbruikersateljee.be), offer no statistical information at all.
"' See OCE REPORT, supra note 61, at 22.
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of Representatives, one judge from Flanders reported that very often, consumers in
his area are able to pay only 2-3000 francs per month (about 50- 75, $60-$90) on
substantial debts, so the repayment period in consensual plans is often "markedly
longer" than the five-year limit for judicial plans.
He remarked that in
"innumerable"
cases
the
debtors
were
willing
to
enter
into
plans for ten years or
15 2
more.
Similarly, in a reform proposal submitted to the House in late 2003 (and
subsequently stalled in committee), two Belgian legislators complained that the
consumer debt relief system had failed "far too often" due to consensual plans that
stretched over as many as fifteen years, or plans that allocated a budget to debtors in
some cases as small as 210 for 2 weeks for a household with two children-far
less than would be guaranteedto debtors in a judicial plan.' 53 If "human dignity" is
defined in terms of exempt income and the "revenue of inclusion" for judicial plans,
why not apply the same minimal baselines to consensual plans?
Some
unrepresented debtors, desperate for any relief available, are apparently agreeing to
unworkable plans at the consensual stage. Just as it did in France, this will
undoubtedly pose problems for the ultimate effectiveness of the Belgian system.
As for judicial plans, the Observatory survey indicates that judicial plans
offering a capital discharge outnumber those not offering a discharge three to
one. 154 This makes sense, given that the consensual plan stage is likely to dispose of
most cases in which no discharge is needed. Unfortunately, the survey does not
indicate what percentage of debts were slated for discharge in judicial plans on
average and under what conditions.
For all types of plans, the Observatory survey suggests that, in the aggregate,
mediators and courts are allocating tight but relatively livable budgets to most
debtors. The survey results reflect that Belgian couples with multiple children,
however, fall into the same sort of "two-income trap" as their U.S. counterparts.' 55
The average allocation for parents with two or more children lies several hundred
Euros per year below the most recently reported official poverty level. 156 Childless
singles and couples seem to receive marginally adequate budgets, but as children
are introduced into the equation, the numbers don't seem to add up to much "human
dignity."
Budget allocations varied significantly among debt-mediators, but those
surveyed reported that the average monthly amounts
left to debtors and paid to
57
creditors in plans in early 2004 were as follows:'

152See Doc parl. Chambre no. 1285/006, supra note 77, at 14-15.
53 See Doc parl. Chambre no. 199/001, supra note 135, at 4-5, 10-11.
54 See OCE REPORT, supra note 61, at 22.
155 See ELIZABETH WARREN & AMELIA WARREN TYAGI, THE TWO-INCOME TRAP: WHY MIDDLE-CLASS
MOTHERS AND FATHERS ARE GOING BROKE (Basic Books 2003).
156See

supra note 117 and accompanying text.
157See OCE REPORT, supra note 61, at 23.

EMERGING CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY SYSTEMS

2006]

2005 "Revenue of
Monthly Monthly
Monthly
Inclusion"
Budget
Payment Budget X 12 (minimum
for
Left
to to
(yearly budget, judicial
plan,
Debtor(s) Creditors for comparison) for comparison)
Single debtors

945

210

Single

1139

141

1321

370

1533

494

1444

225

debtors

with dependent
Adult
Abit
cohabitants
Cohabitants w/
one dependent
Cohabitants
w it
n 2+
with
2+

11,340
(- $14,000)
1,6
13,6689950
(z $17,000)
1,5
15,8529950
(z $20,000)

7450 per year

18,396
18,396ryea
(; $23,000)
1,2
17,3289950
(z $21,500)

per year
per year

per year

By way of rough contrast, the 2004 annual poverty thresholds for similarly situated
debtors in the United States were approximately as follows: singles-$9800; single
parents-13,000; childless couples-$12,650; couples with one and two
children-$15,200 and $19,150. ' 8 Thus, on average, all of these groups other than
couples with multiple children seem able to support a very modest but not
threadbare lifestyle on budgets $4000-$8000 above U.S. poverty thresholds.
2. Luxembourg: Informal Debt Counseling Success, Few Formal Cases
In its first few years, the new overindebtedness law in Luxembourg has barely
been implemented. Only a few cases have made it to the formal overindebtedness
system. The Services seem to be continuing quite successfully their previous
mission of offering budgetary advice and brokering informal arrangements with
creditors. This may change in the near future, as the government has recently
suggested that the time has come for a modification of the new system, in part to
allow for a formal "personal bankruptcy" system focused more on discharging debt
than on reconciling creditors and debtors to repayment plans. 59 This would mark a
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See

UNITED

STATES

CENSUS

BUREAU,

POVERTY

THRESHOLDS

2004,

available

at

http://www.census.govihhes/poverty/threshld/thresh04.html.
159 See MINISTtRE DE LA FAMILLE ET DE L'INTtGERATION, RAPPORT D'ACTIVITE 2004, § 111.1 at 127,

available
http://www.gouvemement.lu/publications/informations-gouvemementales/rapports
e_2004/famille/famille.pdf [hereinafter, MINFAM REPORT 2004]
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significant departure from past policy. Time will tell whether sufficient political
will and social change support a radical new "bankruptcy" policy in Luxembourg.
The first official petition for admission to the new procedure was filed with one
of the two Services in late November 2001, and the first proposed plan was
submitted to the Mediation Commission in late February 2002. In all of 2002 and
2003, however, the Services initiated formal overindebtedness proceedings and
submitted plans to the Commission in only 42 cases. During this same period, the
Services had opened 557 debt consultation files.' 60 In 2004, the Services opened
205 new debt counseling files, but they presented only six new cases to the
Commission. 16' Thus, the percentage of cases of financial distress making their way
into the formal relief process has fallen from about 7.5% in 2002 and 2003 to less
than 3% in 2004. Apparently, most of these cases are handled informally and
conclude with some form of voluntary, Service-brokered arrangement, just as the
Services had been doing since the early 1990s.
The Commission, in contrast, seems to be enjoying less and less success in
achieving agreements. Of the 31 cases submitted to it in 2002, 18 (58%) resulted in
consensual payment plans, but plans emerged in only 4 of 11 (36%) cases in 2003
and in only one of six (17%) in 2004. Most of the remaining cases passed through
6
the Commission to the judicial stage, for which I could find no information. 2
Unfortunately, I found no clear reports on the duration or content of any
consensual or judicial plan, or even on the total number of confirmed judicial plans.
One indirect indication of the content of some of these plans is the rising number of
early completions. The first two plans, executed in 2002, had already concluded by
2003. One ended because the entire debt had been paid off, and the other because
only one creditor remained, and the debtor had worked out a side arrangement with
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at
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available
at
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001 rafam/fami.pdf; MINISTItRE DE LA FAMILLE, DE LA SOLIDARITt SOCIALE ET DE LA JEUNESSE, RAPPORT

D'ACTIVITiE
2002,
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at
108-09,
available
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002rafamille/Famille_.2002.pdf [hereinafter, MINFAM REPORT 2002]; Question parlementaire no. 2268,
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108-10,
available
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161See MINFAM REPORT 2004, supra note 159, § 111.2.2 at 132-33.
162 Some of these cases are abandoned by the debtor after the "consensual" stage before the Commission.
In 2002, 5 of 31 (16%) ended unsuccessfully at this first stage, and in 2003, 1 of the 11 formal cases ended at
the consensual stage. See supra sources cited in note 160. Sometimes debtors abandon their cases even after
initiating

the judicial
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that creditor. 63 Similarly, two more plans (one each from 2002 and 2003)
concluded with a full payoff of debt in 2004, and two more from 2002 were
scheduled to conclude in January 2005.164 Thus, five of the 18 plans from 2002
(28%) concluded successfully in three years or less, and one of the four 2003 plans
concluded in less than two years. With one-quarter of these plans ending in such a
short time, perhaps a significant portion of the remaining plans will conclude in the
near future, as well.
III. CREATIVE TWISTS-INNOVATION
Diverging radically from existing models, including the law in France, the new
laws in both Belgium and Luxembourg have made innovative use of special funds
specifically designed to support the process of relieving overindebtedness. The
source of financing for these funds and their function within the two systems differ,
but the notion of setting up a financing device as part of the system is an intriguing
one that deserves a brief exploration. Part III.A describes how the fund in
Luxembourg facilitates the only significant discharge allowed in that system. Parts
III.B and III.C reveal how the Belgian fund focuses on creditor responsibility by
reallocating to lenders part of the costs of treating and even preventing
overindebtedness.
This brilliantly surprising innovation deserves serious
consideration, both by legislators considering new systems and by those evaluating
current systems.
A. Creditor Welfare Instead of DebtorDischargein Luxembourg
As noted above, unlike similar European laws, the overindebtedness law in
Luxembourg does not allow for judicially imposed discharge of most types of debt.
Nonetheless, the law does provide for a potential indirect discharge in certain cases
in two unusual ways, one of which has helped several debtors already.
First, the law created a state-financed "Fund for Recovery in Matters of
Overindebtedness" to offer consolidation loans to debtors, and these loans
ultimately can be forgiven. The original bill proposed the creation of a fund to
make small loans to debtors to kick-start the plan process. The experience of debt
counselors had suggested that the path to consensual and judicial plans might be
eased if debtors could pay off small debts immediately or offer partial payments to
creditors to entice them to agree to a partial discharge. 65 The Ministry
of Families
66
manages the Fund, which is financed primarily from the state budget.

163See MINFAM REPORT 2003, supra note 160, at 109.

'64 See MINFAM REPORT 2004, supra note 159, at 132,
165 See Doc. parl. no. 4409, supra note 11, at 4, 9-10, 17 (arts. 31-37 and commentary on arts. 31-37).
66 See Law of 8 Dec. 2000, arts. 23-24, as amended by Law of 21 Dec. 2001, art. 41, M~m. A, no. 148, 27
Dec. 2001, p. 2999, 3016-17 (requiring repayments from prior loans to go back into the Fund).
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On the initiative of the Mediation Commission or the court, the Fund manager
can offer debtors "consolidation loans" at the judicial interest rate up to a statutory
maximum amount, which is indexed for changes in the consumer price index. Only
relatively small, "seed money" loans are envisioned from this Fund. The current
maximum loan is approximately 11,625.167 These loans are supposed to be repaid
over no more than 7 years (i.e., the life of a plan), but the Fund manager can follow
the Commission's or the court's recommendation to alter the terms of the loan in a
number of ways, ranging from reducing
or suppressing interest to transforming the
68
"loan" into a non-recourse grant.1
The Fund manger's discretion to forgive these loans represents the first type of
"mini-discharge" in Luxembourg. The state essentially buys certain creditors'
claims, to a statutorily limited degree, and the state can then offer the consensual
discharge that these creditors refused to offer. For all the concern expressed about
"de-responsible-izing" debtors by offering relief from debt, this system of statefunded "creditor welfare" seems like an open invitation to creditor recalcitrance in
the consensual plan process. Hold out long enough, and the Commission might
recommend that the state essentially buy certain creditors' claims. Given the
continuously high rate of conclusion of informal arrangements and consensual plan
in Luxembourg, though, creditors do not yet seem to be responding to this perverse
incentive.
So far, the Fund has offered loans to a significant percentage of the few debtors
in the formal system, and several loans have already been forgiven. The Fund made
four loans for a total of 10,491.36 in 2002,169 one loan of 5802.48 in 2003, and
two more totaling 7392.33 in 2004.170 The Families Ministry reported that three of
the four debtors receiving loans in 2002 began repayment in 2003, which seems to
suggest that the fourth loan was forgiven.' 7 1 More recently, the Ministry reported
definitively that the remaining
3574.59 of three other loans was forgiven in
2004.172 Thus, although the law does not appear to offer consumers a discharge, the
Fund has offered several debtors the equivalent of at least a partial state-financed
discharge.
The second type of discharge-like measure in Luxembourg is similar to the first,
but more far-reaching-and thus more exceptional still. Concerned about the plight
of debtors with no ability to pay anything to their creditors, the Families Ministry

167See

Law of 8 Dec. 2000, art. 26. The current amount results from applying the permanent conversion

rate of 40.3399 Luxembourguish Francs per Euro, see http://www.oanda.com/site/euro.shtml, to the 70,000
franc limit in article 26, increased by the change in the "cost of life" index (consumer price index) between
Jan.
1,
1948,
and
Jan.
1,
2005,
about
+670%.
See
http://www.statistiques.public.lu/stat/tableviewer/document.aspx?Fileld=507.
168See Law of 8 Dec. 2000, art. 26.
169See MINFAM REPORT 2002, supra note 160, at 112.
170See MINFAM REPORT 2004, supra note 159, at 136.
171See MINFAM REPORT 2003, supra note 160, at 114.
172See MINFAM REPORT 2004, supra note 159, at 136.
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inserted a provision near the end of parliamentary debate that allows the Fund in
"exceptional cases" to pay off all or a part of the debt remaining after the debtor has
completed a 7-year plan. This is the only element of the law that the record
describes as being equivalent to the U.S. notion of a "fresh start" (actually
using the
73
English phrase, along with its German version, "Restschuldbefreiung').1
Of course, this exceptional possibility is riddled with provisos. First, such a
state-funded discharge is available only for debtors whose financial situation is
"permanently compromised," whose "manifest insolvency" has made paying off all
debts impossible over the life of a 7-year plan, and whose assets, if liquidated, at the
conclusion of the plan would be insufficient to retire any "significant" part of her
debts. Second, this second "discharge-like" procedure is not available to cover
alimentary debts, debts to the public fisc, or any debts due to "professionals of the
financial sector," which leads one to wonder how often this procedure will be able
to provide any effective relief. Finally, the debtor can obtain only one such debt
repayment every 10 years. 174 The first plans for which such a state-funded
"discharge" might be available would conclude no earlier than spring 2009, so it
remains to be seen how the Commission and courts will interpret the ambiguous
requirements of this relief. Given the strict limitations, it appears as though this
procedure will apply to very few debtors and offer very little relief.
B. Quid Pro Quo From Belgian Lenders, Too
The Belgian law also establishes a fund, but its financing and operation differ
substantially from that of the fund in Luxembourg. Just as European legislators fear
that new debt relief systems will undermine responsible borrowing by consumers,
many are similarly concerned about a lack of responsibility among lenders in the
21st century consumer credit free-for-all. In most of these new systems, central
consumer credit history databases play a key role in encouraging and facilitating
responsible lending in the eyes of European lawmakers. 175 But the Belgian system
has taken one more innovative step to redirect the consequences of lax consumer
lending practices back onto the lenders themselves.
Very early on in the consideration of consumer debt relief, Belgian legislators
proposed a fund to defray some of the costs of consumer overindebtedness
proceedings. Generally, the debt-mediator's fees are chargeable to the debtor and
paid in priority to all other debts through the payment plan. 176 This fund would
cover the mediator's fees in cases in which the debtors were unable to pay those fees
in full.' 77 The government failed to include any such fund in the 1996 bill that

173
See Doc.

parl. no. 4409/08, supra note 87, at 3; Doc. parl. no. 4409/11, supra note 10, at 18.
See Law of 8 Dec. 2000, art. 26.
17 See, e.g., Law of 5 July 1998, art. 19, M.B. 31 July 1998, p. 24613, 24621.
176 See CJ/GW art. 1675/19.
177See Doc. parl. Chambre no. 274/3, supra note 8, at 2, 64, 122, 129.
'74
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would become the final law, but legislators quickly inserted
provisions for such a
178
fund with very little discussion and virtually no opposition.
Unlike the consolidation loan fund in Luxembourg, however, the Belgian fund
is financed by a kind of tax on consumer lenders. Responding to fears about
hampering access for low-income debtors forced to bear the costs of the mediator,
legislators reasoned that shifting these costs to the highly lucrative and extremely
large and growing consumer credit market was a small price to pay for the salve
that mollifies the pain caused by this market. 79 "It is normal," one legislator opined,
"that the costs tied to the treatment 18
of
overindebtedness should be, in part at least,
0
credit."'
of
cost
the
into
incorporated
Consistent with this "cost of doing business" rationale, all consumer lenders
(both for consumption and housing) were originally to pay into the fund, but this
aspect of the new system fell under attack within a month after entry into force of
the new law. A number of professional consumer credit entities challenged this
new "tax," arguing that singling them out from among all types of claimants in
consumer cases violated the equality principle of the Belgian Constitution. In
February 2000, the Belgian constitutional court rejected this challenge.' 8' The Court
of Arbitration held that the Constitution allowed the legislature to draw rational,
objective distinctions among potential consumer creditors. It agreed with the
legislature that singling out professional lenders to bear the burden of financing part
of the consumer debt relief system was quite sensible. The legislative record
pointed out that debts to consumer lenders were present and substantial in all cases
of consumer overindebtedness, whereas debts to utilities, the state, and other
potential claimants were not. Moreover, the water and energy utilities are also
singled out to pay into similar, separate funds administered by the three82Belgian
regions, which help to defray the cost of utilities for low-income residents.
Consumer lenders had lost in the courts, but they ultimately won in the
legislature.
Implementation of the new "Fund for the Treatment of
Overindebtedness" was suspended pending resolution of this legal challenge, and
legislators modified the fund provisions in the meantime. After two years of
reflection, the government decided that it would be more equitable to concentrate
the burden of the "taxes" to be paid into the Fund on lenders with a more direct
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See, e.g., Doc. parl. Chambre no. 1073/2, supra note 94, at 8; Doc. parl Chambre no. 1073/10, supra
note 102, at 3-6; Doc. parl. Chambre no. 1073/11, supra note 1, at 124-25, 130; Law of 5 July 1998, art. 20,
M.B. 31 July 1998, p. 24613, 24622.
179
See Doc. parl. Chambre no. 1073/2, supra note 94, at 9; Doc. parl. Chambre no. 1073/11, supra note 1,
at 10.
I8oSee Doc. parl. Chambre no. 1073/10, supra note 102, at 5.
181 See Order No. 22/2000 of Feb. 23, 2000, available at http://www.arbitrage.be/public/f/2000/2000022f.pdf.
182See also Doc. parl. Chambre no 1073/11, supra note 1, at 124-25; Doc. parl. Snat no. 929/5, supra
note 8, at 18; OCE REPORT, supra note 60, at 25-26.
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connection to-indeed, more direct responsibility for-the consumer debt relief
system.
Now, the "tax" to be paid into the Fund is assessed only on that portion of the
total consumer lending portfolio in default as of the end of each year. 183 Lawmakers
explicitly aimed to "responsible-ize" overly aggressive or lax lenders by diverting to
them part of the costs of relieving the pain of excessive debt-bringing home the
consequences of these lenders' unrestrained risk-taking (even more than losses on
defaulted loans already did). Conversely, this modification was designed to reward
and encourage responsible lenders who analyze the solvency of their consumer84
borrowers more carefully and reduce the level of default in their loan portfolios.
One suspects that lenders will soon develop creative ways of accounting for
defaulted consumer loans to avoid the imposition of this tax, but the idea of this
fund is intriguing. What better way to target one of the supposed primary
contributors to consumer overindebtedness where it will get their attention the
most-their bottom line.
With this concentration of the "tax base," the tax rate consequently increased
substantially. It was originally limited to a maximum of 0.005% of all consumer
mortgage loans and 0.025% of all non-mortgage consumer loans outstanding at
year's end, with the actual rate to be established by Royal Order. 85 Now, the
maximum rate for defaulted mortgage loans has quadrupled to 0.02%, and the
maximum rate for defaulted consumer loans increased by a187factor of eight to
0.2%.186 A Royal Order has set the actual rate at the maximum.
The first disbursements from the Fund reveal that many Belgian debtors have
very little disposable income to finance a payment plan. The first creditor
assessments were paid into the Fund on October 15, 2002, and the first
reimbursements were made to debt-mediators on June 2, 2003,188 Those mediators'
fees that debtors had already proven unable to pay are being reimbursed little by
little by application to a special governing body for the Fund. 89 As of November
2004, the Fund had paid out 922,617 to 909 debt-mediators, all of whose fees had
accrued in 2003.190 Of the some 8000 new cases admitted in 2003, 909 represents a
significant proportion (over 11%) of almost totally impecunious debtors. And an

183 See

184

Law of 19 April 2002, art. 2, M.B. 7 June 2002, p. 26229.
See
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p. 2, availableat http://www.senat.be/wwwcgi/get-pdf?33577277.
185 See Law of 5 July 1998, art. 20 § 3, M.B. 31 July 1998, p. 24613, 24622.
186 See Law of 19 April 2002, art. 2, M.B. 7 June 2002, p. 26229, 26230.
187See Royal Order of 9 Aug. 2002, art. 2, M.B. 6 Sept. 2002, p. 39443, 39444.
188 See Questions
et r6ponses 6crites, Bulletin no. 007, pp. 725, 726-27, available at
http://www.lachambre.be/QRVA/pdf/51/51 K0007.pdf.
See Doc. parl. Chambre. 1285/001, supra note 183, at 9; Royal Order of 9 August 2002, Report to the
King, M.B. 6 September 2002, p. 39441.
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106

ABI LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 14:69

average reimbursed cost per case of about 1015 (about $1250) reveals the
significant expense of this labor-intensive "mediation" system-which does not
include the expenses of the judicial side of the ledger.
It is revealing to focus in conclusion on what creditors are really being forced to
pay for. Creditor assessments from the Fund pay only the mediator fees of those
debtors with "purely symbolic" plans that cannot cover even basic administrative
costs, let alone offering anything to creditors. This is a wonderfully creative and
sensible way of allocating what would otherwise be senseless cost. Faced with
debtors with such miserly incomes, lenders should face facts (as many do) and write
off these consumers' debts outside of the insolvency system altogether.
If
recalcitrant lenders are serious about forcing "can't pay" debtors into economically
valueless judicial payment plans, they (rather than taxpayers) should by all rights
foot the bill. Of course, lenders may plow these costs back into higher interest
rates, but I have found no evidence of complaints of any increased burden on
"average" consumer borrowers in Belgium.
C. Financing FinancialEducation From the Belgian Fund
With the Fund firmly in place, Belgian lawmakers took an even bolder next
step. Buried in article 430 of a massive law surreptitiously entitled "Program-Law,"
the Belgian Parliament authorized draws from the Fund to finance not only unpaid
mediator fees, but also the costs of a public information campaign about the new
consumer debt relief law, as well as "more generally, the financing of measures of
information and of sensitization concerning overindebtedness."' 9' In June 2004,
King Albert's administration issued a Royal Order authorizing 25% of the Fund to
be used for this campaign of "overindebtedness information and sensitization," and
empowering
the governing body of the Fund to select the specific programs to be
192
financed.
Far from discouraging consumers from seeking relief from their debts, the
Belgian legislature and government are using a creditor-financed fund to advertise
such relief. And at least one European state is finally putting its money (actually,
lenders' money) where its mouth is in terms of attempting to cure the problem of
excessive debt through education, rather than contenting itself with the limited
treatment offered by the debt relief law. It remains to be seen what effect, if any,
these new initiatives will have on the future of overindebtedness in Belgium, but
this is definitely an intriguing potential to keep an eye on in the months and years to
come. Will we eventually see this Fund used to make loans to consumer debtors to
facilitate payment plans? Perhaps this is where the systems in Belgium and
Luxembourg will converge.

191
See Law of 22 Dec. 2003, art. 430, M.B. 31 Dec. 2003, p. 62160, 62246.
192
See Royal Order of 23 June 2004, M.B. 15 July 2004, p. 55467.
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IV. CONCLUSION

As states around the world liberalize access to consumer credit, consumer
financial distress is bound to follow close behind. Many European states have
learned this bitter lesson in the past two decades. A growing number of these states
have accepted that this new consumer financial distress, while perhaps not
universal, is real, serious, and worthy of focused attention. More and more states
have adopted the notion that societies that enjoy the benefits of a modem credit
economy must also address its attendant burdens sensitively and humanely.
Opinions differ from state to state on how much relief to offer overextended
consumers and how much responsibility to demand that they take for their own
financial distress. These differences are likely driven by a variety of factors,
including culture, politics, and the relative degree of consumer indebtedness.
One important constant, though, is becoming increasingly clear--consumer
debt relief, including a discharge of unpaid debts, is not a concept compatible only
with the pragmatic, economics-driven approach of "Anglo-American common law"
systems. Civil law states like France, Belgium, and Luxembourg have softened
what appeared to be their rigidly formalistic position with respect to the "sanctity of
contracts" in light of the new challenges of the modem "open credit society." One
can no longer attribute the distinction between states with and without consumer
debt relief to one more contrast of "civil law" versus "common law."
Other states that identify their legal roots in the Code Napoldon are likely to
look to models of consumer debt relief created and tested by their like-minded
civilian neighbors. Recent experience in Belgium and Luxembourg illustrates this
tendency. It also illustrates some potential dangers of borrowing ready-made laws,
even from other civil law systems "within the family." The learning process in
consumer debt relief is far from over in Europe. The French law has undergone a
string of amendments in 1995, 1998, and 2003, and failing to pick up the latest
response to festering problems in the "parent" system means incorporating latent
problems in the "daughter" system.
The new laws in Belgium and Luxembourg seem to reflect a healthy level of
continuity and change from the French model. But they might also have missed
some important lessons. The future may well show, for example, that invading
exempt income in Belgium, refusing to discharge most debt in Luxembourg, and
requiring payment plans of even the most desperate and destitute of debtors in both
systems will require modifications like those recently implemented in France. On
the other hand, Belgium and Luxembourg have contributed to the next generation of
consumer debt relief laws with new lessons of their own through innovative use of
special funds to finance the treatment and even prevention of consumer
overindebtedness. These two states have set the stage for another imminent round
of continuity, change, and innovation in other consumer debt-relief systems that are
sure to emerge soon on both sides of the Atlantic.

